Employment Mediation in the Twenty-First Century: Challenges in a Changing Environment by Berger, Vivian
Other Articles & Essays
EMPLOYMENT MEDIATION IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY: CHALLENGES IN A CHANGING
ENVIRONMENT
Vivian Bergert
I. CHANGES IN THE WORKPLACE AND WORKPLACE COMPLAINTS:
How THEY UNDERMINE LITIGATION OF CLAIMS OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION .................................................... 489
A . Changes in the W orkplace ........................................................ 489
B. Changes in W orkplace Complaints ......................................... 492
C. The Impact of Change on the Efficacy of Employment Civil
R ights L itigation ...................................................................... 498
D. Suggested Reforms, Continued Litigation ............................... 503
II. SECOND-GENERATION EMPLOYMENT MEDIATION: CURRENT
ISSUES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS ................................................. 507
A. The Increasing Popularity of Mediation ................................... 507
B. Why Early, Broad-Gauged Mediation Is Best ......................... 513
1. E arly M ediation ................................................................. 5 16
2. Broad-Gauged M ediation .................................................. 523
III. MEDIATION IN THE WORKPLACE: POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS AND
B EST PRACTICES ............................................................................ 53 1
IV . C O D A .................................................................................................. 54 2
In recent years, two major changes have been taking place in the job
environment. These involve the nature of the workplace as well as the
nature of workplace disputes over claimed violations of anti-discrimination
laws. Together, these changes have had a profoundly negative impact on
the ability of litigation' brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
t The author, Nash Professor of Law Emerita at Columbia University Law School, is
also a mediator.
1. By the term "litigation" I mean both administrative and court proceedings.
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1964,2 and similar statutes, to address job-connected complaints.
First, globalization and other trends have undermined the traditional
model of long-term, often lifetime, employment at one firm. Previously, an
employee would typically work his way up the career ladder until he
retired, gold watch in hand. Now, mutual loyalties have loosened; the new
paradigm is free agency. Apart from employment tenure, moreover, both
job definition and workplace structure have been undergoing key
transformations. Second, claims of discriminatory failure-to-hire have
largely given way to claims arising from discharge, non-promotion, and
other on-the-job complaints. To a great extent, discrimination has "gone
underground:" 3 in a growing number of cases, an objective person 4 would
have trouble distinguishing between unlawful bias and garden-variety
unfair treatment. Illegality has, therefore, become more difficult to prove.
The literature contains a fair amount of discussion of each of these
phenomena-changes in the workplace and in workplace-connected
disputes-and their implications for employment litigation. But scholars
have devoted less attention to their interaction and combined influence on
such litigation. Two notable exceptions, Professors Susan Sturm5 and
Katherine V.W. Stone,6 have advanced my thinking by their writings.7 And
no piece of which I am aware has considered in depth the relationship
between these new developments and mediation of employment
8
complaints.
This article aims to fill that gap. Drawing on my experience as a
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
3. Ann C. McGinley, !Viva La Evolucion! Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title
VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 415, 418 (2000) [hereinafter McGinley, Evolucion].
4. Perhaps one should distinguish between the generic "person" and members of
groups that have historically suffered prejudice. Based on experience, the latter are more
likely to perceive bias than members of the majority group. See infra text accompanying
notes 227-30.
5. See Susan Sturm, Race, Gender, and the Law in the Twenty-First Century
Workplace: Some Preliminary Observations, I U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 639 (1998)
[hereinafter Sturm, Race, Gender]; Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001) [hereinafter Sturm,
Second Generation].
6. See Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the
Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001).
7. Professor Sturm, in particular, has tackled the complex, structural implications of
these changes for workplace governance-externally, through legal regulation, as well as
internally. In addition, Professor Tristin K. Green has recently published a piece taking an
approach similar to that of Professors Sturm and Stone. See generally Tristin K. Green,
Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate
Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91 (2003).
8. In using terms like "employment complaints," "employment law," and
"employment mediation," I exclude labor law, labor-management relations, and other areas
having to do with a unionized work force.
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mediator,9 as well as relevant scholarship, I begin in Section I by enlarging
upon the workplace changes I have already mentioned. Then I proceed to
deal with the adverse effect of these changes on the ability of employees to
obtain meaningful redress of grievances in administrative or judicial
proceedings.
Against this backdrop, Section II then focuses on my primary concern:
employment mediation. Contending that this increasingly common
alternative (or adjunct) to litigation is almost always to be preferred to
court resolution of employee claims, I temper that assertion with two
caveats. One is that many of mediation's considerable benefits are lost or
reduced as time goes by. Thus, it should occur as soon as possible after the
controversy arises: ideally at the workplace level, while the employee still
has her job. The other is that employers should offer mediation for a broad
range of employee complaints, not confine it to allegations of breaches of
legally protected rights. Above all, it ought not be limited to charges of
unlawful discrimination based on race, gender, ethnicity, age, or other
forbidden grounds.
Finally, in Section III, I treat best practices for such in-house
mediation: how it can be structured and managed so as to maximize its
potential to address-and, where needed, remedy-complaints by
individual workers, while also improving the workplace generally.
1. CHANGES IN THE WORKPLACE AND WORKPLACE COMPLAINTS: How
THEY UNDERMINE LITIGATION OF CLAIMS OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION
A. Changes in the Workplace
Professor Stone writes that the "old psychological contract" between
employers and employees, "with its promise of long-term job security,
orderly promotional opportunities, longevity-linked pay and benefits, and
long-term pension vesting, encouraged worker attachment to the firm."' It
also reflected, and perhaps encouraged, the companies' attachment to their
workers.
For many employers, both paternalistic benevolence and shrewd self-
9. I have conducted employer-employee mediations in various contexts. These
include, most prominently, court-connected mediation programs in the United States District
Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York as well as mediation programs
sponsored by administrative agencies, such as the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) and the New York State Division of Human Rights. I also served
briefly as a mediator for the United States Postal Service, and I handle cases on a private
basis.
10. Stone, supra note 6, at 524.
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interest counseled good treatment of employees-the human capital in
which they had so heavily invested. In some companies, workers and
managers could, without too much of a stretch, envision the firm as a
daytime family. A young man-of course, the prevailing model was
male-could sign-on after graduation from high school or college. With
the years would come friendships and alliances that might well outlast a
marriage; "divorcing" one's firm might seem, financially and emotionally,
as drastic a move as divorcing one's spouse.
By the end of the twentieth century, however, business conditions had
significantly altered. Globalization has broadened the field of competition,
blurring the distinction between internal and external markets, forcing
companies to pay ever greater attention to the bottom line." In the face of
ongoing technological change, qualities such as flexibility, adaptability,
and capacity to lower short-term costs increasingly separate the "sheep
from the goats" 2 of industry. 3 Fidelity to employees, however, has no
similar effect on success.
In this environment, the lifetime employment paradigm has been
replaced by "precarious employment."'' 4 Businesses hire growing numbers
of "temps" and part-timers, who do not get benefits, and outsource
erstwhile in-house tasks to various independent contractors." For many
employees in this new universe, changing jobs has become a routine or, at
least, not uncommon, feature of life. Job-hopping can be a benign
phenomenon where the worker voluntarily quits in order to pursue career
advancement. But where the worker is terminated, stress and anxiety can
be expected, especially if she is older. Such feelings are only enhanced by
the current economic downturn and consequent scarcity of substitute
positions.
The old world of employment also offered considerable opportunities
to men who had a strong back rather than intellectual talents; the present
one, though, affords few. The United States, like other developed nations,
focuses not on production and assembly but instead on "knowledge and
service work."' 16 More than ever, a good brain and possession of skills,
especially the skill of learning new skills, characterize the successful
11. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, The Changing Workplace As a Locus of Integration in
a Diverse Society, 2000 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 331, 354-55 (2000) [hereinafter Estlund,
Changing Workplace]; Vicki Schultz, Essay, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1919-
28 (2000).
12. Matthew 25:32.
13. See Stone, supra note 6, at 549, 556, 561-62; Sturm, Race, Gender, supra note 5, at
640.
14. Stone, supra note 6, at 542.
15. See, e.g., Estlund, Changing Workplace, supra note 11, at 355-56; Stone, supra note
6, at 539-40.
16. Stone, supra note 6, at 561.
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worker. Loyalty-staying put-does not.
In addition, the structure of many firms, and of the jobs within these
firms, has been changing. An increasing number of companies reject the
traditional hierarchical model of top-down decisionmaking and orderly
progression along "job ladders,"17 embracing instead what Professor Stone
calls "microlevel job control."' 18  This regime entails a "flattening of
management positions" and a concomitant "shift in authority to cross-
functional work teams."' 9 The members of such teams cooperate with each
other in exercising power with respect to matters previously confined to
supervisors,2° such as pay, evaluation, promotion, and assignments.
Accordingly, members wield considerable influence over the work life of
their colleagues.2 Organization along these lines is thought to enhance the
firm's productivity and flexibility.22  The emerging self-governance
23paradigm predictably stresses the values of teamwork and consensus.
This transformation of the working environment has bred a "new
psychological contract.' '24 Instead of promising employment security, it
offers "employability security."" This consists, among other things, of
26furnishing general skills training as well as networking opportunities.
These make the worker more marketable both inside and outside the firm.
Portable capital is vital, of course, to an employee who expects to switch
positions and companies a number of times in the course of her career.
Being afforded the means to acquire it may, therefore, exceed in
importance the precise amount of one's current salary.
All this being said, I emphasize that many businesses still follow
traditional patterns. We should not overestimate the degree of change at
the present time. What we have is evolution, not revolution, in the working
world; some segments of the economy manifest it more than others. Yet
neither should we underrate the significance of the post-modem firm's
development. Its features represent the wave of, at least, the foreseeable
17. Id. at 531.
18. Id. at 524; see also Sturm, Race, Gender, supra note 5, at 640-41 (describing the
rise in popularity of flexible governance forms).
19. Stone, supra note 6, at 567; see also Green, supra note 7, at 102-03 (noting that by
1990, 47% of Fortune 500 firms had at least one self-directed team).
20. See, e.g., Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 5, at 460-61. The S.C. Johnson &
Son, Inc. "self-directed work teams" are one example of this phenomenon. Sturm, Race,
Gender, supra note 5, at 646-48.
21. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 6, at 608; Sturm, Race, Gender, supra note 5, at 662.
22. See, e.g., Sturm, Race, Gender, supra note 5, at 646.
23. See, e.g., Estlund, Changing Workplace, supra note 11, at 350-5 1; Sturm, Race,
Gender, supra note 5, at 648.
24. Stone, supra note 6, at 524.
25. Id. at 569 (quoting ROSABETH Moss KANTER, ON THE FRONTIERS OF MANAGEMENT
192 (1997)).
26. See id. at 524; Sturm, Race, Gender, supra note 5, at 642.
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future. Moreover, these features interact with changes in the most common
complaints made by employees and increasingly cast doubt on the ability of
litigation to resolve such claims satisfactorily.
B. Changes in Workplace Complaints
Employee discontent arises from many different sources, not only (or
even mainly) from biased employer behavior. Yet for a gripe to mature
into a cause of action-and my focus at the moment is on litigation-it has
to rest on a legal foundation. Typically, the worker who cannot get his
employment dispute resolved in the workplace and, therefore, files an
administrative charge or complaint in court must invoke one or more of the
civil rights laws barring employer discrimination on grounds such as race,
national origin, gender, or age. These include the Equal Pay Act of 1963,27
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (Title VII),28 the Age
29Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),3° and similar state3' and local3 2 provisions.
As background, it is crucial to note a major cause of these statutes'
centrality in litigation by employees. Apart from the ban on discrimination
noted above, non-unionized workers have only some general regulatory
laws, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 33 and the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970, 34 and a few special purpose laws-for
example, the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) 35 -to protect them.
36
"At-will" employment prevails in every state but Montana.37 Under
this rule, of which most workers are unaware until trouble strikes, 38 an
employer may fire an employee for any reason or no reason so long as it
27. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000).
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
29. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000); see also Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29
U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (2000) (providing similar coverage to federal employees and job
applicants).
31. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290-301 (McKinney 2001).
32. See, e.g., N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE§§ 8-101 to 8-131 (2001).
33. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000).
34. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2000).
35. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
36. This is less true of unionized workers, who enjoy the benefits of the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935, Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
37. Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights, and Why Does
It Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6, 8 (2002).
38. See Ann C. McGinley, The Emerging Cronyism Defense and Affirmative Action: A
Critical Perspective on the Distinction Between Colorblind and Race-Conscious Decision
Making Under Title VII, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1004, 1013 n.57 (1997) [hereinafter McGinley,
Cronyism].
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does not act on the basis of impermissible discrimination. 3 Not many non-
union employees have the clout to negotiate for greater security: tenure
except for dismissal for cause or, at minimum, a stated term of years.
Moreover, given the progressive deunionization of the work force 40 (in
2000, collectively bargained contracts applied to just 13.5% of workers),4'
most employees hold their jobs solely at their employers' discretion.42
Finally, termination aside, employers have always had free reign over
whom to hire and how to run their organizations, subject again to the
caveats for illegal bias-driven conduct and terms in union-management
contracts.
In the early post-Civil Rights era, the concern was getting minority
applicants a foot in the door; hence, litigation primarily targeted
discriminatory failure-to-hire. 43 By the close of the twentieth century, the
focus of litigation had switched from workplace entry to workplace exit as
non-traditional employees-initially admitted, then booted out-
increasingly complained of terminations allegedly based on
discrimination." These employees have also protested non-promotion,
lack of training, harassment by bosses or fellow workers, and other
inequalities in the terms and conditions of employment. Commentators
have dubbed such grievances "[s]econd-generation" complaints.45 In light
of the rise in job insecurity aggravated by hard times, and reflected in the
new psychological contract, one can expect that this trend will continue and
even intensify.
The second generation workplace yields many fewer instances of
deliberate and blatant discrimination.46  For example, except in certain
39. Id. See generally Jay Feinman, The Development of the Employment-at- Will Rule,
20 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 118 (1976); Jay Feinman, The Development of the Employment-at-Will
Rule Revisited, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 733 (1990).
40. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1019 (1991).
41. Elizabeth Neumeier, The Long and Winding Road: A Look at the Evolution of
Conflict Resolution in the Workplace, ACRESOLUTION, Spring 2002, at 20, 22.
42. Over time, at-will regimes have developed a number of exceptions. See Cynthia L.
Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1655, 1655
(1996) [hereinafter Estlund, Wrongful Discharge]. The most prominent of these forbids
discharge on grounds that violate an important public policy. See, e.g., McGarrity v. Berlin
Metals, Inc., 774 N.E.2d 71 (Ind. Ct. App.) (holding that plaintiff may maintain tort action
for wrongful discharge after dismissal for refusing to take actions that could subject him to
personal liability), transfer denied, 783 N.E.2d 703 (Ind. 2002); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS § 7.17, at 557-58 (2d ed. 1990).
43. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 40, at 984-85.
44. See id.; Matt A. Mayer, The Use of Mediation in Employment Discrimination
Cases, 1999 J. DISPUTE RESOL. 153, 163.
45. Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 5, at 460 (internal quotations omitted).
46. See, e.g., Marjorie A. Silver, The Uses and Abuses of Informal Procedures in
Federal Civil Rights Enforcement, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 482, 491-92 (1987).
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blue-collar, sex-segregated industries, women and minorities rarely suffer
total exclusion from the workplace.47 Turndowns of qualified employees
from protected groups who seek promotion, in favor of less (or no more)
qualified male Caucasians, often seem due to simple cronyism rather than
overt bias.48 By the same token, we seldom encounter the "N-word" or
other racial or ethnic slurs-and when we do, it is almost never at a mid-
management or higher level.49 Even much milder, "politically incorrect"
speech is becoming relatively rare.
Anecdotal evidence drawn from my own mediation practice largely
confirms these observations. Notably, of approximately sixty employment
cases I have handled in the past five years, only one involved
discrimination in hiring. A young African-American attorney, call him
Derek,5° seeking employment at a small law firm with no minority
professional staff was ultimately rejected by the senior partner, Morris.
The latter voiced suspicion at the fact that Derek had not received an offer
from a larger firm, since "they love to hire tokens," and made other
unambiguously biased remarks. Predictably, perhaps, the guilty individual
belonged to an older generation (Morris was in his mid-seventies). In some
sense, even this incident seems more second-generation than first: until
quite recently, the dearth of minority law school graduates virtually
precluded such litigation.
To be sure, one still hears horror stories. Recently, for instance, a jury
awarded $3.3 million to a black trucker in Colorado who had been
subjected to a racially hostile environment that included graffiti with
swastikas, rope tied into hangman's nooses, and symbols of the Ku Klux
Klan.5 In another case, a rare illustration of flagrant racism by a highly
positioned professional, a Caucasian administrator called an Indian chemist
under his supervision a "brown nigger.' '51 Some forms of sexual
harassment, moreover, feature not just demeaning words or gross displays,
like pinup calendars or pornography, but also unwelcome, assaultive
47. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 40, at 984-85, 1014-15.
48. See generally McGinley, Cronyism, supra note 38 (arguing that cronyism should be
treated as forbidden discrimination).
49. In general, one sees more blatant discriminatory conduct in the blue-collar work
environment. Low-level supervisors may make racist or sexist remarks or, more often,
condone such comments by the complainant's fellow workers.
50. In recounting my cases, I have altered names and other potentially identifying
information.
51. See Racial Harassment: Jury Awards $3.3 Million to Harassed Black Trucker, 38
Fair Empl. Prac. Newsl. (BNA) 961 (Nov. 21, 2002); see also Mitsubishi Bias Settlement
Approved by District Court, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Newsl. (BNA) 921 (Apr. 26, 2001)
(relating settlement in lawsuit about intimidation of minority workers by "name calling,
racist graffiti ... and nooses left dangling").
52. Trivedi v. Cooper, No. 95 CIV. 2075, 1996 WL 724743, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17,
1996).
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touching.53 Finally, it should be borne in mind that egregious cases
yielding reported opinions underrepresent the actual number of such cases;
the worst examples are more likely to settle early.
54
Yet prevailing forms of bias tend much more than in earlier days to be
subtle, complex," and frequently unconscious,56 reflecting a largely
unspoken organizational culture.5 ' No longer enduring wholesale exile
from shop or office, women and other outgroup members now protest
being "fr[ozen] ... out of crucial social interactions." 58  They also
complain of receiving less attractive work assignments, poorer training,
harsher assessments of their capabilities, hyper-scrutiny of their
performance, and non-acknowledgment of their achievements.5 9
Such below-the-radar forms of discrimination wreak special havoc in
the new workplace, which puts a premium on acquisition of skills and
relationships; 60 the harm can be especially severe where groups of
employees possess meaningful decisionmaking powers.6' In this
53. See, e.g., Hatley v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 308 F.3d 473 (5th Cir.) (finding error in
district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law for employer on sexual harassment
claim when female waitresses endured repeated instances of physical aggression,
inappropriate touching, and vulgar comments by male supervisors), reh'g denied, No. 01-
60289, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 24504 (5th Cir. 2002); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305
F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (reversing district court's grant of summary judgment for
employer in incident of sexual harassment in which co-workers grabbed a gay male
employee in the crotch and stuck their fingers in his anus through his clothing), cert. denied,
123 S. Ct. 1573 (2003). See generally Rene, 305 F.3d at 1065-66 (citing fifteen cases with
variety of sexual harassment behaviors).
54. Unlike the official reporters, however, services such as the Employment
Discrimination Report, published by the Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., do recount some
settlements of cases in litigation.
55. See Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 5, at 461.
56. This phenomenon has been widely discussed. See, e.g., Judith Olans Brown et al.,
Some Thoughts About Social Perception and Employment Discrimination Law: A Modest
Proposal for Reopening the Judicial Dialogue, 46 EMORY L.J. 1487, 1491 (1997);
McGinley, Evolucion, supra note 3, at 418; Michael J. Yelnosky, Title VII, Mediation, and
Collective Action, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 583, 590 (1999). See generally Charles R. Lawrence
III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 317 (1987).
57. See Martha Chamallas, Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories Meet Title
VII: Some Contemporary Influences, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2370, 2372 (1994) ("Legal doctrine
that does not address the impact of workplace structures, processes, and cultural norms on
the lives of employees is incapable of responding to many of the 'second generation' issues
arising in Title VII disputes.").
58. Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 5, at 468.
59. Id. at 470.
60. Sturm, Race, Gender, supra note 5, at 642.
61. African-American employees sued S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., alleging that the
previously mentioned self-directed work teams, see supra note 20, disadvantaged them with
respect to promotion, pay, and working conditions because the system of decisionmaking
relied on the collective judgments of primarily Caucasian colleagues. See Sturm, Race,
Gender, supra note 5, at 649-50.
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environment, if colleagues or immediate superiors regard a worker as not a
genuine part of the team-because, for example, that person is female,
foreign, dark-skinned, or "too old"-he or she will lose all sorts of tangible
and intangible benefits that make labor more rewarding and turn a job into
a career. Eventually, the worker may even be fired.
I have seen many illustrations of these kinds of problems in my
practice. The reason, I believe, is that many non-cutting edge work
settings, such as one's local bank, now demonstrate some of the features I
have described. Consider, for instance, the case of Bill. While not the
most zealous employee (he constantly counted the days to his retirement),
Bill had, nevertheless, performed quite competently for forty years as an
Assistant Vice President in one of the country's largest banks, XYZ.
Recently, though, the company had changed while Bill had not.
From a stodgy dinosaur, rarely altering the way it delivered basic
services at its branches, XYZ turned into an aggressive,, "lean and mean"
sales organization. Increasingly, XYZ stressed customer relations,
teamwork, and competitiveness, values it never before touted at its sleepy
neighborhood offices. Bill's newly hired manager, Lynn, a younger
woman, used terms alien to him like "huddle," "team meeting," and
"brainstorming session" to describe activities in which employees now had
to take part. This business model disadvantaged Bill, somewhat of a loner,
by placing a premium on interpersonal skills he lacked; his performance
evaluations, predictably, nose-dived. Lynn wrote that Bill was failing to
meet expectations in "[t]eamwork, [c]ustomer [i]nteraction, and
[1leadership" and had not contributed ideas in a "positive, enthusiastic
manner." In short, she concluded, Bill was not a "real team player.,
62
Eventually, the bank forced Bill to retire.
The point of this story is not that organizations have never before
emphasized qualities like cooperation and sociability, nor that the
somewhat curmudgeonly Bill had formerly been an ideal employee.
Rather, the issue is one of degree: his personality defects simply mattered
more in the new workplace. Also, to an unmeasurable extent, the very fact
of being older had marginalized him. Bill's uniformly younger cohorts as
well as his boss felt they had little in common with him. Employees who
62. Other cases of mine have also featured workers criticized as non-team players. In
one of these, again a complaint based on age, the young, new owner of a family firm-his
father, the founder, had recently retired-faulted a long-term employee, a man in his sixties,
for "slipping out" before an after-hours party for a co-worker, conduct the boss considered
"bizarre." The employee explained that his wife and four-year old son had been waiting for
him and he had been compelled to leave because the boy was "acting up." The employer
also expressed annoyance that the employee had failed to attend a company outing at
Yankee Stadium. A recent United States Court of Appeals decision upheld a grant of
summary judgment against a discharged employee criticized for, among other things, not
being "a team player." Koski v. Standex Int'l Corp., 307 F.3d 672, 674 (7th Cir. 2002).
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lunch together and share gossip during their breaks find it easier to bond in
their work life. After the mediation, I wondered if the age gap between Bill
and his colleagues had predisposed the latter to view him as an outsider:
Who had excluded whom first? was a difficult question. Yet, regardless,
the bottom line was the same: Bill no longer fit the XYZ profile and,
therefore, he had to go.
"Subtle patterns of non-interaction or exclusion,"63 such as those I
have described, combine with the blurring of lines of authority in many
companies to make it hard for outgroup members to acquire influential
positions in the twenty-first century workplace. 64 "[I]nformal and invisible
power structures" have become more salient; but absent "orderly job
ladders, 65 an employee who wishes to complain about a lack of
advancement in the new environment may be unsure what exactly
constitutes promotion and whether she actually has been denied one 6-et
alone because of bias.
In addition, the very success of the second generation in gaining
white-collar and (sometimes) higher-echelon employment has led to
complaints by minorities and women that they are getting unfairly negative
67performance reviews, based on overly subjective criteria. It is, indeed,
easier to count the number of widgets an assembly-line worker produces
than to assess an employee's "output" of satisfied customers, or useful
68suggestions, or to weigh her contribution to a team effort. Thus, in
handling claims of unlawful discharge, I frequently encounter nebulous
defenses: the plaintiff evinced "personality problems," made associates or
management uncomfortable, was bad-tempered or excessively aloof.
These boil down to management's current catchall censure: the employee
has poor interpersonal skills. Such hard-to-counter criticism is directed
most often at workers of different cultural backgrounds-stereotypic
"standoffish" Asians, "touchy" Caribbeans-or at women, who are held to
higher standards of niceness.69 The application of "soft" criteria can easily
63. Sturm, Race, Gender, supra note 5, at 642.
64. See Stone, supra note 6, at 606-08.
65. Id. at 525-26.
66. Id.
67. Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 5, at 469.
68. See Green, supra note 7, at 103 ("[E]valuation of work performance is becoming
more decentralized, subjective, and contextual."). See generally Sturm, Second Generation,
supra note 5, at 484-89.
69. With respect to gender stereotypes:
[A]n employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be
aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender. .... [Wle
are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or
insisting that they matched [sic] the stereotype associated with their group ....
An employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose positions
require this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out
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mask discrimination.
Having examined changes in the work environment and in job-related
complaints, I turn now to the repercussions of these phenomena on the
employee's ability to obtain redress for adverse action that allegedly stems
from unlawful bias. As we shall see, the complainant's litigation path is
increasingly strewn with obstacles.
C. The Impact of Change on the Efficacy of Employment Civil Rights
Litigation
As suggested above, with reference to claims of denial of promotion,
the worker in the second-generation world may routinely have trouble
determining whether to attribute his problems to discrimination. The line
between subtle or unconscious bias and mere bad management,
miscommunication, insensitivity, or "equal opportunity" nastiness is often
indiscernible.7° As a co-worker said of the white boss of one of my
African-American complainants: "Barbara just wasn't a nice person; that's
what it boils down to." Current sources of workplace friction may also
relate to economic and class issues beyond the purview of statutory bans.7
Although the affected employee doubtless suffers regardless of how
one characterizes the source of his or her difficulties,72 labels matter. If a
complaint cannot be couched in terms of bias, the worker will usually have
no remedy. Title VII and similar laws do not enact a "generalized code of
workplace civility."73  Further, even if the employee decides to claim
discrimination (whether sincerely or in an effort to shoehorn her problems
into a recognized legal category), she may find it hard to persuade a
decisionmaker (judge, jury, or agency official) of the accuracy of her
designation.
Prevailing on employment discrimination complaints is generally
tough; more than ninety-five percent of them fall under the rubric of
of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not. Title VII
lifts women out of this bind.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250-51 (1989) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
70. See, e.g., Peterson v. Draper & Kramer Mortgage Corp., No. 00 C 3889, 2002 WL
1769987, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2002) (describing the senior vice-president accused of
sexual harassment as "an equal opportunity yeller"). See generally Sturm, Second
Generation, supra note 5, at 472 ("Under some circumstances, the boundaries between
legitimate and illegitimate behavior will be quite difficult to draw.").
71. Silver, supra note 46, at 491-92.
72. Cf. McGinley, Evolucion, supra note 3, at 445 (citing psychology research for
proposition that, from perspective of bias victim, the question of whether bias is intentional
is less important than the desire for fair treatment).
73. Stone, supra note 6, at 611.
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"disparate treatment." 74 In order to make out a cause of action, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the employer treated the employee-because of his
protected trait-worse than other workers who did not possess that
characteristic; in other words, he must show an intent to discriminate.75 If,
as is usual, he has no direct evidence of biased motivation, he must satisfy
the so-called McDonnell Douglas schema.76 This requires the plaintiff to
meet the preliminary burden of establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination.77 That being done, the burden of production shifts to the
employer to rebut the presumption of discrimination by articulating-not
proving- "some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its conduct,78 a
light burden virtually any employer can satisfy. The onus then shifts back
to the plaintiff, who bears the ultimate burden of persuading the finder of
fact that prohibited bias caused his discharge or other adverse job action-
in other words, that the defendant's explanation is pretextual. 79 This can be
74. Yelnosky, supra note 56, at 588.
75. The other category consists of "disparate impact" cases, which do not require proof
of intentional discrimination. Disparate impact doctrine proscribes facially neutral
employment practices that have a disproportionately harsh effect on employees in protected
classes, unless those practices are shown to be justified by business necessity. See Int'l Bhd.
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977). See generally Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that the use of employment prerequisites that have
an invidiously discriminatory impact, but are not related to job performance, can be
prohibited even without a showing of intent).
76. See Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981). See
generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Ann C. McGinley,
Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in
Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 212-21 (1993) [hereinafter McGinley,
Credulous Courts].
77. At this stage, the plaintiffs burden "is not onerous." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. In
order to meet it, the plaintiff must show: (1) membership in a protected class (e.g., a racial
minority); (2) qualification for the position at issue; (3) an adverse employment action, such
as failure-to-hire or termination; and (4) continuing need for an employee with the
plaintiffs qualifications, or replacement by another employee in circumstances creating an
inference of discrimination. See id. at 253 n.6 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S.
at 802). Some courts phrase the fourth requirement more generally as follows: "the
circumstances surrounding the action give rise to an inference of... discrimination."
Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 468 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S.
993 (2001).
78. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
79. See id.; see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 134
(2000) ("In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity
of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose.").
In hostile environment (e.g., sexual harassment) cases that do not culminate in a tangible
employment action, the plaintiff must show: (1) she belonged to a protected group; (2) she
was exposed to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was premised on her protected
status; (4) it was "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her]
employment and create an abusive work environment"; (5) it was "both subjectively and
objectively offensive"; and (6) the employer is liable for the harasser's conduct. ABIGAIL
COOLEY MODJESKA, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW § 1.05, at 29 (3d ed. Supp. 2002)
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80a daunting task.
In addition to doctrinal hurdles, workers alleging discrimination
encounter a number of practical problems.8" For example, in my
experience employers in general receive better, or at least more consistent,
representation. Indeed, the would-be plaintiff may have trouble hiring any
lawyer.82 Without one, and facing the defendant's counsel, the worker
stands virtually no chance of victory.83
Most employees cannot afford, as can their opponents, to pay an
attorney by the hour. Thus, the plaintiff must locate a lawyer willing
(perhaps, with a small retainer) to take his case on a contingent fee basis
and "front" the expenses of litigation. The lawyer, in turn, must rate the
likelihood of success, a sizeable judgment, and statutory attorneys' fees as
high enough to justify the investment of her time and money. To be sure,
some attorneys gamble on dubious claims, but ordinarily, those who do aim
to dispose of the matter quickly, for nuisance value, leaving the client with
only two-thirds of an already paltry sum.
If the employer resists settlement and the plaintiffs lawyer decides
not to incur the costs of thorough discovery, the suit will probably be
dismissed. For discovery is, on the whole, more crucial to the complainant
than the defendant. The latter usually employs most of the potential
witnesses for both sides; it also possesses all or most of the relevant
documents. 8  Therefore, at the very least, the defendant can assess the
(footnotes omitted). See generally Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993)
(applying criteria from Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)).
80. See, e.g., Estlund, Wrongful Discharge, supra note 42, at 1670-71. The governing
statutes also bar retaliation against a person who has "made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated... in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation" under these laws or has
"opposed any practice made unlawful" by them. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2000)
(ADEA). To prove a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) he
engaged in activity protected by the statute; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action;
and (3) a causal link exists between (1) and (2). See MODJESKA, supra note 79, § 1.04, at I -
11 to 1-12 (3d ed. 2002); see, e.g., Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87,
94 (2d Cir.) (finding that the claim filed was not the cause of the employee's dismissal),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 951 (2001). In my experience, plaintiffs often find it easier to prove a
charge of retaliation than one of substantive discrimination. Significantly, to prevail on the
former, a plaintiff need only show that he sincerely and reasonably believed that
discrimination had occurred-he need not show that he was correct. See, e.g., Alexander v.
Gerhardt Enters., Inc., 40 F.3d 187, 195-96 (7th Cir. 1994).
81. Much of this discussion draws on conversations that I have had over the years with
plaintiffs, defendants, and their counsel.
82. See Yelnosky, supra note 56, at 587. See generally Estlund, Wrongful Discharge,
supra note 42, at 1673 (describing the difficulties that middle-income and poor plaintiffs
have getting lawyers).
83. The employee who proceeds pro se is somewhat less disadvantaged at the agency
level. But cf. infra note 298 (noting that very few EEOC complainants receive a favorable
determination).
84. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge, supra note 42, at 1670.
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strength of its position before much formal disclosure takes place.
The employer enjoys other strategic advantages, too. Supervisory
employees will almost always back up the company. The same is true of
the plaintiff's co-workers: few employees still on the job will take the risk
of supporting a colleague who is often long-since gone. Moreover, advised
by counsel specialized in handling discrimination claims, as well as by
Human Resources staff, many employers build an elaborate paper trail (for
example, of an employee's errors) for use in the increasingly common
event of litigation. Most employees are less than perfect; savvy bosses can
create a "plausible record" to cover unlawful motivation.85
Finally, employers-as defendants and corporate litigants-generally
86profit from delay, endemic in an age of teeming court and agency dockets.
The individual plaintiff, by contrast, normally finds waiting stressful, at
times so much so that he or she will settle for a pittance in order to avoid
further frustration. This step may be very tempting to ex-employees who,
out-of-work or underemployed, are feeling the immediate financial pinch
of a lost salary and other benefits.
In short, the worker who would sue his employer, past or present,
embarks on a fairly perilous venture. Brief reflection will reveal,
moreover, that this assessment applies in spades to typical second-
generation complaints.
As we have seen, these rarely yield a "smoking gun." Hence, the
employee must run the McDonnell Douglas course and hope that
circumstantial evidence of biased motives will overcome the company's
usually reasonable-sounding explanation for its conduct. And where
prejudice is unconscious, the employee will not be aided by evidence of
lies or coverups on the employer's part. In these circumstances, judges and
jurors understandably find it hard to detect a boundary between unknowing
and nonexistent discrimination-particularly as they, too, may harbor
81negative stereotypic views of persons in the plaintiff's group.
Further, to the extent that current complaints allege co-worker.... 88
harassment (nowadays, often, the most severe type of discrimination), the
defendant will escape liability unless the plaintiff can prove that
management either knew or should have known of the offensive behavior
85. Id.
86. See Yelnosky, supra note 56, at 587 (noting EEOC's slowness in processing
charges).
87. See Sara Kristine Trenary, Rethinking Neutrality: Race and ADR, DisP. RESOL. J.,
Aug. 1999, at 40, 44.
88. This is particularly true where women work in traditionally male environments. See
Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex
Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1832-39 (1990).
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and, nevertheless, failed to take swift and effective measures to stop it. 9
Such knowledge may be difficult to show when employees subtly exclude
minorities, women, or others in disfavored classes, thereby denying them
access to the networks and team participation so vital to success in the
current workplace. This is especially true if the members of the majority
do not realize what they are doing.90
Some special hazards that second-generation plaintiffs face in
prosecuting age discrimination claims also bear mention. ADEA
complaints, for example, frequently follow in the wake of layoffs-all too
common in the present economy. The "RIF'd" employee (RIF stands for
"reduction in force") will not ordinarily succeed in proving invidious
intente in the context of a mass downsizing unless the employer heavy-
handedly targets only older workers while retaining similarly situated
younger workers, or otherwise revealing biased motivation.
In addition, allegedly ageist comments made at the job site are apt to
be viewed as, at worst, ambiguous on the issue of intent. Questions
concerning the retirement plans of a worker of 60 or observations that he
"is beginning to slow down," "is unwilling to change," or "has not kept up
with the times"92-especially when stray,9' as opposed to incessant--do not
necessarily imply prejudice against the old, as racial or misogynistic slurs
clearly connote hostility toward people of color or women. Rather, they
straddle a blurry line between judgments about an employee's
performance, which are permitted, and assumptions based on age, which
are not.94 At a time when learning new skills is more important than ever
89. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 759 (1998).
90. The fact that nontraditional workers remain outside "crucial networks of interaction
and advancement ... [is] not necessarily due to intentional motivation." Sturm, Race,
Gender, supra note 5, at 669.
91. The Supreme Court has not decided whether disparate impact claims can be raised
in an ADEA context. Three justices have intimated a negative view. See Hazen Paper Co.
v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 618 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
and Thomas, J.). The lower courts are divided on the issue. Compare Mullin v. Raytheon
Co., 164 F.3d 696 (1st Cir.) (holding that the ADEA does not allow for claims of disparate
impact), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 811 (1999), with Lewis v. Aerospace Cmty. Credit Union,
114 F.3d 745 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that disparate impact theory is viable under the
ADEA), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1062 (1998). Recently, the Court had an opportunity to
resolve the issue but then chose to avoid it, dismissing its writ on the ground that certiorari
had been improvidently granted. Adams v. Florida Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322 (11 th Cir.),
cert. granted, 534 U.S. 1054 (2001), and cert. dismissed, 535 U.S. 228 (2002).
92. 1 have culled the quoted statements from my cases.
93. See, e.g., Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 468 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 993 (2001); cf. McGinley, Evolucion, supra note 3, at 475-77 (dealing with
"Stray Remarks Doctrine" in the context of Title VII).
94. See Bluight v. Consol. Edison Co. of NY, Inc., No. 00 CIV 3309, 2002 WL 188349,
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2002) (finding that defendant's CEO did not evince age
discrimination when he said that "the company needed 'new, young thinking and
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before, older workers may, in fact, become less useful to their employers
(become "deskilled") as evolving technologies and other novelties strain
their capacities to learn and adapt.
Given the problems of redressing discriminatory conduct in the
second-generation workplace, critics of the present state of affairs have
called for reforms. Meanwhile, however, aggrieved employees resort to
administrative agencies and courts in record numbers to pursue their claims
under current law.
D. Suggested Reforms, Continued Litigation
Some pro-plaintiff commentators urge repeal of the onerous
requirement of proof of discriminatory intent in cases alleging disparate
treatment.95 But regardless of its merits (as to which I take no position),96
this recommendation is highly unlikely to be adopted. Numerous decisions
enshrine the prevailing law in this area.97 As for Congress, it responds to
public opinion-which lacks the desire to weight the scales more heavily
toward the employee. Indeed, if anything, the tide has turned in the
opposite direction, with many people believing that we have gone too far in
defending the rights of statutorily protected groups. 98 Similarly, proposals
to force-or even permit-employers to make more aggressive efforts to
advance the prospects of women and minorities fly in the face of current
judicial99 and popular"°° sentiment hostile to broad affirmative action.
As an alternative to scrapping intent as an element of disparate-
treatment claims, some scholars have urged an expanded definition of the
concept to encompass unconscious discrimination. Professor Ann C.
McGinley, for example, advocates that the requisite state of mind be found
when the defendant has knowledge or reason to know that its conduct was
technologically expert people,' . . . [and] that 'there will be no more cradle to grave type
employees').
95. See, e.g., McGinley, Cronyism, supra note 38, at 1058
96. Cf. Yelnosky, supra note 56, at 592-93 (rejecting the proposal). Discussion of that
question is beyond the scope of this article.
97. See, e.g., Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993); Texas Dept. of Cmty.
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 335 n.15 (1977).
98. See infra text accompanying notes 215-20.
99. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Taxman v. Bd.
of Educ., Township of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 521 U.S.
1117 (1997), cert. dismissed, 522 U.S. 1010 (1997).
100. See McGinley, Cronyism, supra note 38, at 1036-37, 1037 n.208 (citing the passage
in 1996 of Proposition 209, the California Civil Rights Initiative, and similar provisions in
other states, barring the use of preferences based on categories such as race, sex, or national
origin).
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biased, consciously or unconsciously.10' Although well-meant, this
approach is extremely impractical: how would the plaintiff prove the
existence of this mentality? It is often difficult enough to establish
deliberate discrimination. To be sure, experts can testify that much
prejudice nowadays does not rise to a conscious level; considerable
research supports this conclusion. 0 2  But how can one reliably show,
except perhaps in cases of flagrant stereotyping, 0 3 that the particular
employer in question acted, in effect, on the basis of unintentional bias? In
my view, such a reformulation of the intent requirement would do little for
the plaintiffs who need help the most-those caught up in the ambiguities
of typical second-generation disputes.'°4
Different scholars go beyond doctrinal tinkering, arguing for a
fundamental change in emphasis from the "search for bigots to the impact
of workplace structures and processes on female and minority
employees."'0 5 They offer provocative analyses of problems in the job
environment-among other things, recommending solutions that
supplement civil rights litigation.
Professor Sturm, for instance, contends: "[I]t becomes necessary to
experiment with structural approaches to legal intervention that focus on
systems of decision making and explicitly employ organizational incentives
and non-legal actors in the project of creating lawful, inclusionary practices
within institutions."' 1 6 She provides several examples of firms that have
restructured themselves in various ways, such as revamping their systems
for hiring, promotion, and training, as did Home Depot, in order to
eliminate former practices that gave an edge to white males.'0 7 Professor
Vicki Schultz, another scholarly critic of the status quo, makes yet more
sweeping proposals. Dealing mainly with gender issues, against the
backdrop of job insecurity in the emergent global marketplace, Schultz sets
forth an ambitious agenda of "measures like job-creation programs, ...
enhanced employee representation, and a reduced workweek for
everyone."' 0 8
Much of this conceptual writing amounts to a general blueprint for
101. See id. at 1021. But see Lamont E. Stallworth et al., Discrimination in the
Workplace: How Mediation Can Help, Disp. RESOL. J., Feb.-Apr. 2001, at 35, 40 (rejecting
this suggestion).
102. See supra text accompanying note 56.
103. See, e.g., McGinley, Evolucion, supra note 3, at 447 n. 195 (discussing Price-
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)).
104. See also Stone, supra note 6, at 609-14 (suggesting other doctrinal reforms designed
to provide relief for plaintiffs).
105. Yelnosky, supra note 56, at 590. See, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 57, at 2371-72;
Schultz, supra note 11, at 1938. See generally Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 5.
106. Sturm, Race, Gender, supra note 5, at 675.
107. See Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 5, at 509-19.
108. See Schultz, supra note 11, at 1885.
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regulation of the twenty-first century workplace; more detailed discussion
of it exceeds the scope of the present article. I wish to focus on improving
the handling of employment disputes within the existing legal framework.
I believe, however, that my recommendations, set out below, are consistent
with the structural approach.
As I previously stated, the majority of plaintiffs who mount litigation
against their employer confront rather bleak prospects. Many claims will
fail to survive summary judgment'0 9 or settle for mere nuisance value." °
The few suits that do make it to judgment after trial-approximately five
percent or less of the total brought" '-yield little improvement in results
for workers. A recent U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) study revealed that plaintiffs represented by private attorneys, as
opposed to agency lawyers, enjoyed a success rate of merely twenty-seven
percent; on appeal, the figure was sixteen percent.112
Despite these discouraging results, the number of job discrimination
actions rose continuously throughout the seventies, eighties," 3 and
nineties." 4 Such filings increased 2,000% in federal court in the past two
decades, while the overall docket grew a relatively meager 125%.,
5
Agency filings have likewise been climbing: at the EEOC, 84,442 were
109. See generally McGinley, Credulous Courts, supra note 76.
110. Cf. Mayer, supra note 44, at 156-57 (stating opinion that many plaintiffs' attorneys
file employment discrimination lawsuits with a nuisance-value settlement in view).
11. See CPR INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, How COMPANIES MANAGE
EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES 26 (2002) [hereinafter CPR INSTITUTE]; cf. Frank Evans & Shadow
Sloan, Resolving Employment Disputes Through ADR Processes, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 745,
753 (1996) (noting that "at least ninety percent of civil disputes are settled before full trial
on the merits").
112. Nancy Montweiler, Disabilities: Internal Review Reflects High Success Level of
EEOC Attorneys; Upswing in Recent Filings, 19 Empl. Discrim. Rep. (BNA) 203 (Aug. 21,
2002) [hereinafter Internal Review]; Press Release, U.S. EEOC, EEOC Issues
Comprehensive Litigation Report (Aug. 13, 2002) at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/8-13-
02.html (last visited May 13, 2003). The EEOC as plaintiff faced better odds: it won about
60% of the cases it took to trial and 80% of the cases appealed. Id. A study of 966
employment cases in the New York federal courts between April 1997 and May 1998 -
which did not treat EEOC cases separately - yielded very similar results: of the 3.5% of
cases tried, plaintiffs won only 26.5% of the time. See Richard R. Ross, The Pros and Cons
of Mandatory Company Employment Plans, ALTERNATIVES, Nov.-Dec. 2002, at 202
(reporting on a study by the law firm of Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliff L.L.P.).
113. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 40, at 983-84, 988-90 & tbl.2.
114. See, e.g., David H. Gibbs, Employment Survey Says That Major Companies
Increasingly Use Tailored Programs and Processes, ALTERNATIVES, Nov. 2001, at 237.
115. See Mayer, supra note 44, at 155. In the twenty-four month period ending June 30,
2001, 42,525 civil rights employment cases were filed (in 2000, 21,404; in 2001, 21,121).
These amounted to approximately 8% of the total filings, 516,403 cases (in 2000, 263,049;
in 2001, 253,354). See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Statistics Table for the Federal
Judiciary, 28-29 tbl.C-2 (June 30, 2001), at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judiciary2001/tables/c02jun01.pdf (last visited April 1I, 2003).
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logged in FY 2002-up from 72,302 in FY 1992.16 At the same time, state
administrative charges have mounted."
17
This pattern has prompted much speculation concerning its cause.
Professor John J. Donohue, a close student of the matter, believes that the
burgeoning of these lawsuits is not significantly due to factors like the
growth in the number of lawyers or any rise in discrimination." ' Instead,
he attributes the 1970-1989 increase in large part to a parallel increase in
unemployment. 1 9 Further, he cites the expansion in covered employees by
legal changes such as the passage of the ADEA' 20 in 1967 and the 1972
amendments to Title VII 12' as instigators of litigation. 122 The later
enactment of the ADA 23 in 1990 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991
(CRA)124 -which, for the first time, allowed Title VII
25 and ADA 126
plaintiffs to recover not only lost pay but also compensatory and punitive
damages-probably had a similar effect.
127
With respect to possible additional causes, Donohue theorizes:
"Improvements in the workplace have spawned strife in the courtroom."'
128
Insofar as the anti-discrimination laws have fulfilled their aim of enhancing
opportunities for women and minorities in the work force, better jobs have
made it more "worthwhile to sue.', 129 Donohue's thesis supports the point I
made in connection with the story of Derek, the African-American would-
be associate turned down by a white law firm: 130 only now, in the second
116. The increase has not been steady, however: the total peaked at 91,189 in 1994. U.S.
EEOC, Charge Statistics: FY 1992 Through FY 2002, at
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.htmi (last visited April 11, 2003).
117. See Penny Nathan Kahan & Lori L. Deem, Mediation as a Model for Resolving
Employment Disputes in the New Millennium, 1 EMPLOYEE RTS Q., Spring 2001, at 28, 28-
29.
118. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 40, at 1000-04.
119. See id. at 990.
120. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
121. Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat. 103, 104, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2000) (extending
coverage to federal, state, and local government employees).
122. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 40, at 990, 1000.
123. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327,42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
124. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. and
42 U.S.C.).
125. 2 U.S.C. § 1331(a)(1), (b)(1) (2000).
126. 2 U.S.C. § 1311 (a)(3), (b)(3)(A) (2000); see also Matthew W. Daus, Mediating
Disability Employment Discrimination Claims, DisP. RESOL. J., Jan. 1997, at 17 (noting
continuous rise in disability claims). Rehabilitation Act plaintiffs are also covered. See
supra note 30; see also 2 U.S.C. § 131 l(a)(3), (b)(3)(A) (2000).
127. Such damages are subject to statutory caps ranging from $50,000 to $300,000,
depending on the number of workers that the defendant employs. See 42 U.S.C. §
1981 a(b)(3) (2000).
128. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 40, at 1015.
129. Id. at 1007-08.
130. See supra text accompanying note 50.
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generation, have more than a handful of people of color possessed the
credentials to apply for good professional positions as well as the incentive
to try to obtain legal redress, if rejected or otherwise harmed by reason of
employer bias.
Finally, I note my own speculation that outsized verdicts '-very rare
but much ballyhooed-have continued to attract a disproportionate number
of plaintiffs. Yet attorneys, if not their clients, should know the less
publicized fact that giant recoveries are vulnerable to substantial reductions
on remittitur.3 I can merely add the conjecture that hope springs eternal,
in the hearts of both lay persons and lawyers, and that, therefore, a poor
prognosis does not deter as many lawsuits as rational analysis might
predict.
Whatever the causes might be, however, the proliferation of
employment discrimination actions has had some untoward consequences.
Since these have manifested themselves in the mediation setting, I will
discuss them in that connection. The rest of this article will treat the
subject of employer-employee mediation: its considerable benefits, as
compared to litigation, and aspects that could stand improvement.
II. SECOND-GENERATION EMPLOYMENT MEDIATION: CURRENT ISSUES
AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
A. The Increasing Popularity of Mediation
In recent years, mediation has been widely touted as an option
superior to litigation. Its advertised virtues133 include, first, its problem-
13 1. See, e.g., Tresa Baldas, Verdicts Swelling from Big to Bigger: Jurors Desensitized,
or Just Plain Angry, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 25, 2002, at Al (discussing recent huge verdicts, two
of which exceeded $3 billion); Gibbs, supra note 114, at 237 (noting that large verdicts
against employers are becoming increasingly common); Adam Liptak, Pain-and-Suffering
Awards Let Juries Avoid New Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2002, at A14 (reporting
affirmance of $20 million pain-and-suffering award for plaintiff in Gilbert v. Daimler
Chrysler Corp., No. 227392, 2002 Mich. App. LEXIS 1168 (Mich. Ct. App. July 30, 2002),
appeal granted, SC: 122457, 2003 Mich. LEXIS 718 (Mich. Apr. 8, 2003)).
132. See, e.g., Trivedi v. Cooper, No. 95 CIV. 2075, 1996 WL 724743, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 17, 1996) (reducing $700,000 verdict to $50,000).
133. Supporters of mediation are legion, as are their books and articles. The next few
paragraphs draw upon the following sources, among others, which deal with employment
mediation, as well as on my own experience. See Cindy Cole Ettingoff & Gregory Powell,
Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment-Related Disputes, 26 U. MEM. L.
REV. 1131, 1136-44 (1996) (discussing the benefits of ADR generally). See generally CPR
INSTITUTE, supra note 11l, at 26-28; Lois A. Baar & Michael A. Zody, Resolution
Conferences Conducted by the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division: The Elements of a
Successful Administrative Mediation Program, 21 J. CONTEMP. L. 21, 36-39 (1995); Isabelle
R. Gunning, Diversity Issues in Mediation: Controlling Negative Cultural Myths, 1995 J.
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solving orientation: making matters right for the future replaces fixation on
whom to blame for past occurrences. In addition, it maximizes party
autonomy, allowing the affected individuals-in a confidential
environment-to fashion an agreement that tailors relief to their own
situation and incorporates terms beyond what a court or agency could
order. Such an accord is apt to be seen as fairer than one imposed by third
persons. Mediation, thus, offers the possibility of integrative, "win-win"
solutions that meet the interests and needs of both sides. Sometimes, too, it
gives an opportunity for emotional catharsis, helps to preserve or repair
relationships between the parties, and provides a broader education in
conflict management.
Faster and simpler than litigation, mediation also yields both monetary
and non-monetary savings. Monetary savings include reductions in costs
connected with using attorneys, conducting discovery, and diverting parties
and witnesses from their usual productive activity. Non-monetary savings
are exemplified by reductions in the amounts of stress and anxiety that are
typically produced by legal proceedings. Mediation can, in addition, pare
backlogs in courts and agencies.
Most of these benefits could, theoretically, be achieved by unassisted
negotiations. Realistically, though, the presence of a neutral who can make
judicious use of the confidential caucus dramatically improves the
bargaining process. For example, a mediator can provide a needed reality-
check, helping the parties evaluate the strengths-and weaknesses-of
their case. She can enhance the chances of settlement because she knows
more about a party's bottom line 1 4 and, in general, his thoughts and
concerns than does his opponent. Also, she is able to advance a
participant's suggestion as her own, thereby avoiding "reactive
devaluation" 135 and reflexive rejection by the other side. Frequently, too,
she has the best judgment regarding those persons required to be at the
table. She can, for example, involve family members or friends who
possess a stake in the conflict, who have some degree of decisionmaking
power, or are able to furnish needed support to the plaintiff, enhancing his
or her capacity to make an informed and voluntary choice. 1 6 Simply put,
Disp. RESOL. 55, 56-57; Kahan & Deem, supra note 117, at 29-31; Yelnosky, supra note 56,
at 598-604.
134. No mediator should think, however, that parties will be entirely candid, even in
caucus, about the monetary amount at which they would agree to settle.
135. Bobbi McAdoo, The Growing Gap Between Theory and Practice, J. ADR IN EMP.,
Winter 2000, at 8, 9.
136. Admittedly, inclusion of certain family members or friends might appear to hinder
the process, but allowing the parties to involve even difficult people usually works better
than leaving them out. In the latter situation, the sponsoring party may feel aggrieved and
the person excluded may snipe from the sidelines-undercutting the progress made during
mediation.
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the mediator adds value to the negotiating process.
Good press about mediation has both caused and resulted from its
increasing use. Along with other forms of alternative dispute resolution
(ADR), such as open door policies, human resources and peer review,
ombudspersons, and arbitration, 37 mediation in employment cases has
dramatically increased in the past decade. 38
For one thing, the federal government's use of ADR has grown
substantially because of the passage of laws directing or encouraging its
establishment.' 39  These include the Civil Justice Reform Act, 40 the
Administrative Dispute Resolution Acts of 1990141 and 1996,142 and the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998.14' The EEOC, on its part, has
committed itself to ADR. For instance, its "Agency Program to Promote
Equal Employment Opportunity" mandates that federal agencies provide
ADR to their employees and attempt to resolve complaints as early as
possible.'" Virtually all federal agencies now offer ADR.
145
The most widely touted initiative, in which I briefly participated, has
been REDRESS, sponsored by the United States Postal Service (USPS);
the name stands for "Resolve Employment Disputes, Reach Equitable
Solutions Swiftly.' ' 146 Created in 1994, in connection with a class action
settlement, 47 REDRESS is based on so-called transformative mediation.
48
137. See Evans & Sloan, supra note 111, at 747-48; Gibbs, supra note 114, at 237.
138. See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham et al., Exploring the Role of Representation in
Employment Mediation at the USPS, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 341, 343 (2002); Lisa
B. Bingham & David W. Pitts, Research Reports, Highlights of Mediation at Work: Studies
of the National REDRESS Evaluation Project, 18 NEGOTIATION J. 135, 135 (2002); Robert
E. Meade (Sr. Vice-Pres., Am. Arb. Ass'n), Remarks at Cutting Edge Issues & Trends in
Workplace ADR Programs, a program at the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Nov. 21,
2002.
139. See generally John Bickerman, Master Class: A Look at ADR, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 3-
10, 2001, at B I0; R. Gaull Silberman et al., Alternative Dispute Resolution of Employment
Discrimination Claims, 54 LA. L. REv. 1533 (1994).
140. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (2000).
141. Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736, 5 U.S.C. §§ 571- 81, 583 (2000).
142. Pub. L. No. 104-320, 110 Stat. 3870, 5 U.S.C. §§ 570a, 584 (2000).
143. Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112 Stat. 2993, 28 U.S.C. §§ 651, 652-58 (2000); see also
Silberman et al., supra note 139, at 1555-56 (mentioning Executive Orders that promote
ADR).
144. Stallworth et al., supra note 101, at 44, 83-84.
145. Bickerman, supra note 139, at B15.
146. See generally Lisa B. Bingham, REDRESSTm at the USPS-A Breakthrough
Mediation Program, ACRESOLUTION, Spring 2002, at 34 (describing REDRESS program
and its results from first years in full operation); Bingham & Pitts, supra note 138, at 142-
44; Cynthia J. Hallberlin, Transforming Workplace Culture Through Mediation: Lessons
Learned from Swimming Upstream, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 375 (2001) (transcribing
speech given by an early architect of REDRESS program).
147. Hallberlin, supra note 146, at 376-77.
148. See ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION
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This process focuses less on achieving agreement than on empowering the
parties to rely on their own capacity to solve problems and acknowledge
the other's concerns. Under its protocol, a worker who files an informal
complaint of discrimination may choose to refer the matter to an outside
(non-USPS) mediator; one is provided, on the job, within a scant two to
three weeks. 149 As will be seen, the program has proved successful in
several respects. 5° Further, the EEOC itself offers a mediation program, in
which I participate pro bono; it handles equal opportunity cases not
resolved by the federal agency when an administrative law judge, prior to
hearing, believes that settlement talks might be fruitful.
Mediation of employment-related disputes has become prevalent in
the private sector as well. 5' "Increasingly more employers recognize that
the use of mediation makes good business sense."'12 A 1995 Government
Accounting Office study reported that fifty-two percent of large private
employers have ADR programs for non-union personnel; another study,
also published in 1995, "found that 57% of... large manufacturing firms
had instituted some form of ADR."'' 53  Most often, these programs are
mandatory and multi-step, with review by the human resources department,
management panels, and mediation being the steps most frequently used.
5 4
Some mediation initiatives, moreover, involve the government in non-
governmental employee conflicts. For example, programs run by the
federal courts 55 mediate employment-discrimination charges, in addition to
other types of matters, pursuant to a judge's order. In my experience,
sometimes the court merely ratifies what the parties request; at other times,
it twists arms to obtain consent or mandates the process regardless of the
participants' wishes. In certain areas, such as the Southern and Eastern
Districts of New York, where I volunteer, neutrals agree to serve pro
bono.156 The EEOC, where I also mediate, offers mediation on a strictly
(1994) (setting forth the theory and practice of this type of mediation).
149. See Bingham, supra note 146, at 34.
150. See infra notes 164, 166, 169-71, and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., Evans & Sloan, supra note 111, at 747-48; Stone, supra note 6, at 559-60.
152. Stallworth et al., supra note 101, at 84.
153. Bingham et al., supra note 138, at 343 & nn.5-6.
154. See Gibbs, supra note 114, at 237. But cf. CPR INSTITUTE, supra note 11l, at 9
("What used to be called 'stepped' programs.., have given way to a smorgasbord of
processes available to employees, frequently in any sequence.").
155. See Ettingoff & Powell, supra note 133, at 1157 (noting that the Committee on
Long Range Planning of the Judicial Conference of the United States has "encouraged the
district courts to implement a variety of ADR techniques and resources to achieve a more
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of civil litigation."). Many states have also
established voluntary or mandatory court mediation programs. See Kate Hollenbeck, The
Sounds of Silence: Compelling Mediator Testimony in Olam v. Congress Mortage Co., 20
CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 5, 5 (2002).
156. See R. S.D.&E.D.N.Y. 83.11 (f)(l) (applying to E.D.N.Y. only), 83.12(l) (applying
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consensual basis to some complainants and respondents in non-federal
agency cases.'57 It does so very early on, before the employer files a
response. The program relies on both staff and (theoretically) compensated
contract mediators. Chronically under-funded, however, the program tends
to run out of money before the end of the fiscal year, thus forcing the
agency to recruit neutrals willing to work for free. 5
Finally, the relevant underlying statutes encourage the use of ADR in
employment discrimination cases.' 59 So, too, did the proposed National
Employment Dispute Resolution Act of 2001 (NEDRA).' 6 Among other
things, NEDRA would have obligated all federal agencies, courts, and
businesses receiving $200,000 or more in federal funds, to "establish an
internal dispute resolution program or system that provides, as a voluntary
option, employee-disputant access to external third-party certified
mediators" to address complaints of discrimination. 6' At the behest of the
employee, the employer would have had to participate in the process and
furnish and pay for the mediator.1
62
As one who devotes substantial time to mediation, I, predictably,
concur with those who expound its virtues. For the reasons previously
given, I think that this process is, in the main, superior to litigation as a
means of dealing with people's conflicts. I also believe the employment
arena presents no exception to the rule. On the contrary, job disagreements
lend themselves especially well to that approach. Such studies as exist
support the view that mediation, in both agency
64 and workplace161
to S.D.N.Y. only), available at http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/rules/rules.pdf (last visited
May 12, 2003).
157. See Silberman et al., supra note 139. But cf Mayer, supra note 44, at 164-66
(arguing against mediation by the EEOC). See generally Matthew A. Swendiman, The
EEOC Mediation Program: Panacea or Panicked Reaction?, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 391 (2001) (giving history and description of the program).
158. But cf Dominguez Reports Drop in Charge Inventory Expanded Mediation
Emphasis in Fiscal 2002, 19 Empl. Discrim. Rep. (BNA) 473 (Oct. 30, 2002) [hereinafter
Dominguez Reports Drop] (noting that, according to EEOC Chair Cad Dominguez, the
agency managed to expand mediation in FY 2002).
159. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (2000) (ADA) (applying to "disputes arising under this
chapter"); Ettingoff & Powell, supra note 133, at 1158.
160. H.R. 820, 107th Cong. (2001). See generally Stallworth et al., supra note 101, at
36-7, 85-87 (discussing and endorsing NEDRA). According to THOMAS: Legislative
Information on the Internet, at http://thomas.loc.gov/, the bill was referred to, but never
reported out of, the Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations of the House
Committee on Education and the Workforce.
161. H.R. 820, 107th Cong. §§ 6(a)(l), 6(b)(l)(A) (2001).
162. See id. §§ 3(d), 6(b)(2).
163. For treatment of some criticisms of ADR, see infra text accompanying notes 248-
50.
164. See, e.g., Hallberlin, supra note 146, at 377-78 (summarizing study of REDRESS
by Hallberlin and Professor Lisa B. Bingham); Yelnosky, supra note 56, at 597-98
(describing EEOC pilot program study).
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contexts, not only contributes to settling disputes,166 but also generally
satisfies the parties.
161
My own experience supports this optimistic conclusion, which
extends, as well, to matters in court. A final resolution occurs in
approximately three-quarters of the employment cases that I handle.1
68
More importantly, many participants express contentment with the
process-sometimes even without obtaining money or other tangible
rewards.
For instance, Joan, an African-American employee, who felt very hurt
at what she construed as favoritism by her Caucasian former supervisor
toward a white Latina colleague, decided at the close of the session to drop
her EEOC charge despite the lack of a quid pro quo. Joan stated that she
had gotten what she desired merely by receiving the opportunity to
confront and question her boss about the events that had so disturbed her.
Other complainants have spontaneously hugged or kissed me at the end, in
gratitude that the mediation had terminated their ordeal and allowed them
to move on with their lives. Significantly, these were not necessarily cases
in which the employee had received substantial monetary relief.
From the vantage of the respondent, systemic effects like cost
savings 169 and docket reduction1 70 likely amount to the major reason for
engaging in mediation. The human side typically weighs less heavily with
them than with complainants, but there are even employees who evince
little interest in anything but the bottom line. Some employers' agents,
165. See, e.g., Gibbs, supra note 114, at 237 (surveying programs of major companies);
Yelnosky, supra note 56, at 597-98 (referencing a GAO study of companies' in-house
mediation).
166. See Hallberlin, supra note 146, at 379 (finding that 80% of REDRESS cases were
dropped, withdrawn, or settled).
167. See, e.g., id. at 380; Gibbs, supra note 114, at 238 (praising mandatory programs);
L. Camille H6bert, Establishing and Evaluating a Workplace Mediation Pilot Project: An
Ohio Case Study, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. REsOL. 415, 432 (1999); Yelnosky, supra note 56,
at 602-03. I am not aware of any published evaluations of mediation of employment
disputes once they have gone as far as court.
168. The rate is considerably lower, however, in one subset of my cases: those involving
federal agency employees. For a number of systemic reasons (e.g., mediocre lawyering by
many of the agency attorneys and pervasive indifference to resolution since only
settlements, and not judgments, are paid out of an agency's budget), these tend to be
difficult to settle.
169. Stephanie Morse-Shamosh, First Vice President and Program Facilitator in
PaineWebber's Issue Resolution Office, says: "[I]f we keep one case a year out of the
court.., the program has paid for itself." Focus On Early Dispute Resolution Programs,
THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, Oct. 2000, at 3 [hereinafter Early Dispute
Resolution] (on file with the author). See generally Bingham & Pitts, supra note 138, at
142-44 (noting that cost savings are possible through programs like REDRESS).
170. See Hallberlin, supra note 146, at 380 (recounting that, by the end of REDRESS's
first year, informal complaints had gone down 8%; by the end of the second, formal ones
had decreased 30%).
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however, also express gratification about the improvement in personal
relations that the process tends to generate.'
71
Joan's boss, Joe, for example, who thought that he and Joan had
enjoyed excellent on-the-job rapport, was extremely upset by her racial
discrimination charge; by his account, he had paid the Latina co-worker
more attention because of some problems she was having and not for any
other reason. After lengthy discussion with Joe, Joan told me in caucus
that she no longer believed he had acted out of bias. With her permission, I
proceeded to orchestrate a conversation in joint session in which she said
she hadn't wanted to accuse him of prejudice, but "after all these bad things
happened, [she] couldn't come up with any explanation other than race."
When Joe learned that Joan's feelings had undergone change, he looked as
though a hundred-pound weight had fallen from his shoulders. I am
convinced that Joe's relief stemmed from the parties' new-found insight
into each other, and not from any pragmatic concern for his employer's
(New York City's) legal liability.
In sum, mediation of job disputes is becoming increasingly popular
and, for the most part, deservedly so; I, therefore, support it. Yet my
experience strongly suggests adoption of a more nuanced stance than
simple endorsement.
B. Why Early, Broad-Gauged Mediation Is Best
Specifically, I conclude, first, that because major benefits of mediation
tend to erode with the passage of time and, in particular, after the onset of
litigation, it should take place as soon as possible after the conflict in
question arises "-preferably, at the workplace level. 17  The success of
171. See id. at 380-81 (finding that more than two-thirds of REDRESS participants
believed that mediation would have a long-range effect on relationship with the opposing
party). The architect of REDRESS states: "I needed more than 'deals.' I was looking for
improved relationships." Id. at 378.
172. Other experienced students of the field and mediators are, generally, in accord. See,
e.g., Evans & Sloan, supra note IlH, at 767; Stallworth et al., supra note 101, at 37;
Yelnosky, supra note 56, at 599. But cf Mayer, supra note 44, at 160-61 (cautioning that
early EEOC mediation may preempt any meaningful discovery).
173. I do not, however, suggest that parties should have to mediate complaints if a more
informal process, like conversation with a supervisor or a human resources officer, solves
the problem to the satisfaction of the participants-that is the point of "stepped" programs.
See supra text accompanying note 154. Ms. Morse-Shamosh, PaineWebber's Program
Facilitator, indicates that the majority of workplace complaints in her company are resolved
before mediation, the third step in the ADR program. The earlier two involve handling
through either the Open Door policy or the Issue Resolution Office; unlike mediation, these
are both internal processes. See Early Dispute Resolution, supra note 169, at 2; Meade,
supra note 138; see also CPR INSTITUTE, supra note 11, app. G at 457-61.
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REDRESS 174 and similar programs in non-governmental employment
settings,175 which seek to extinguish early flickers of discontent before
these burst into flame, shows that this view is well-founded.
Second, I conclude, mediation should be made available for all types
of employment-related controversies-not just for those involving claimed
violations of legal rights and, most critically, not just for complaints of
unlawful discrimination. 116 As will be shown, 17 7 for a number of reasons,
programs geared to the latter alone may actually disserve the interests of
both employers and workers.
These recommendations of early and broad-gauged mediation are
complementary. Later mediations will often occur in connection with court
or agency proceedings. 78 Administrative bodies like the EEOC and similar
state 179 and local' 80 outfits will only handle disputes that fall within their
stated jurisdiction: charges of discrimination. Judicial referrals to ADR
programs will cover solely complaints that, on their face, make out a cause
of action. Since most employees, as we have noted, have no legally
cognizable basis for suing their employer except under the civil rights laws,
court-related mediation will also tend to center on allegations of bias.'8 '
Of course, parties in disagreement can hire a private mediator at any
174. See supra text accompanying note 149 (emphasizing that mediation takes place
within two to three weeks of complaint).
175. See supra text accompanying notes 151-54.
176. See Melissa Janis, Is Your Alternative Dispute Resolution Program a Flea-dip?:
How to Prevent Your Employment ADR Efforts from Going to the Dogs, N.Y. ST. B. ASS'N
LAB. & EMP. NEWSL., Spring 2002, at 10, 12. Most workplace ADR applies, at a minimum,
to charges of infringement of equal employment opportunity laws.
177. See infra text accompanying notes 223-36.
178. "Later" is almost always synonymous with "in litigation." Depending on whether
the state in which a complaint arises has a state or local law proscribing employment
discrimination, the aggrieved worker must file her charge with the EEOC either 180 or 300
days after the unlawful act occurred. See MODJESKA, supra note 79, §§ 6.02, 6.03, at 6-3 to
6-8 (3d ed. 2002). In order to have the right to sue in federal court, the plaintiff must
exhaust her administrative remedies. See id. § 6.10, at 6-37 to 6-37 (3d ed. 2002). A civil
action must be filed no later than 90 days from receipt of a right-to-sue notice from the
EEOC. Ordinarily, a right-to-sue notice must issue when the EEOC fails to act within 180
days after the filing of a charge. See id. § 6.10, at 6-38 (3d ed. 2002) (detailing
circumstances in which a fight-to-sue notice must issue).
179. For example, the New York State Division of Human Rights, for which I briefly
mediated. See also Baar & Zody, supra note 133 (discussing Utah Anti-Discrimination
Division's mediation program).
180. For example, the New York City Commission on Human Rights.
181. Statutory charges of discrimination are sometimes coupled with common law tort
claims (e.g., intentional infliction of emotional distress) arising from same operative facts.
These may be even harder to prove than discrimination. See, e.g., Howell v. N.Y. Post Co.,
Inc., 612 N.E.2d 699, 702 (N.Y. 1993) ("[O]f the intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims considered by this Court, every one has failed because the alleged conduct was not
sufficiently outrageous .... ). They tend, therefore, to be secondary in importance.
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time and negotiate any matter they wish-regardless of whether the issues
raised implicate legally protected rights. But irrespective of whether or not
discussions are sponsored by a public body, mediation undertaken after the
commencement of litigation can hardly proceed without reference to it;
people bargain in the shadow of the law. 8 2  Certainly, in my own
experience, litigants (ordinarily represented by counsel, at least by the time
they file in court) focus heavily on claims and defenses in their talks. As
we will see, postponing the process and, in effect, limiting its ambit
sacrifices many of mediation's potential benefits.
Some major employers do, happily, offer workplace dispute resolution
of extensive jurisdictional scope; these include PaineWebber, Credit Suisse
First Boston (CSFB), and McGraw Hill, to name a few. 183 In the words of
Elizabeth W. Millard, Director and Counsel of CSFB: "Our program covers
everything as well as everyone." 18 4 Such global schemes even apply to ex-
employees,'85 an especially salutary feature since many second-generation
complaints involve workers who have been fired. Unfortunately though,
other companies and institutions-among them, the United States Customs
Service (USCS)18 6 and the USPS, which sponsors REDRESS' 87-confine
their programs to claims of infringement of anti-discrimination laws. In
light of the fact that the USPS is "the second largest employer in the
country,"'88 and that the USCS also employs a significant number of
people,' "89 these limitations have a broad effect.
Still other employers, for instance, Alcoa fall midway along the
spectrum: they do not facially exclude complaints unrelated to bias, but
they do restrict coverage to assertions of violations of law.' 90 In a variant
182. See generally Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow
of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
183. See CPR INSTITUTE, supra note 111, at 15-17.
184. Id. app. F at 91; see also id. app. G at 464 (explaining that PaineWebber's program
covers "almost any dispute").
185. See, e.g., PAINEWEBBER FORUM FOR ALTERNATE ISSUE RESOLUTION, F.A.I.R.
QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 7 (2000) (proprietary company handbook). All internal company
documents, cited in footnotes, that are not published in external sources are on file with the
author.
186. See Andy Pizzi, New Procedure for Disputes Alleging Discrimination, U.S.
CUSTOMS TODAY, Dec. 1999, at
http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/custoday/dec I 999/proced.htm (last visited May 10, 2003).
187. See Bingham, supra note 146, at 34.
188. Id.; See U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, ANNUAL REPORT 2001 39, 45 (2001) (stating that the
USPS has a total of 891,005 employees), available at
http://www.usps.com/financials/-pdf/2001ar.pdf (last visited May 10, 2003).
189. See U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2001 5 (2001) (stating
that the agency has 19,496 employees), available at
http://www.customs.gov/ImageCache/cgov/content/publications/uscs- freport200 _-2epdf/v
l/uscs_5freport200l.pdf (last visited May 10, 2003).
190. See CPR INSTITUTE, supra note I l, at 15.
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of this model, some companies permit workers to raise any issue in early
stages of a "stepped" process, while later stages, including mediation and
arbitration, cover only allegations involving legally protected rights. 91 In
an "at-will" world, however, the distinction between limitations to legal
claims and limitations to claims concerning equal employment opportunity
rights makes little difference, as both types of complaints are based largely
on discrimination.
1. Early Mediation
There is widespread agreement with respect to my first conclusion
about mediation: "earlier is better" 92 -at least, in the ordinary run of cases.
Several reasons supporting this view have application across the board;
some, though, have particular force in employment disputes.
For one thing, expenses rise and savings diminish when people
embark on litigation: above all, when they go to court. From a settlement
perspective, outlays for lawyers and other trappings of an adversarial
proceeding simply divert to third persons monies that might otherwise go
toward resolving the matter. In addition to expending funds, parties incur
opportunity costs when they must deflect time and effort from productive
work to activities such as helping counsel with discovery and testifying at a
deposition, hearing, or trial.
Given the economics of employment litigation, discussed earlier,
plaintiffs usually do not incur significant costs during litigation; however,
the plaintiffs attorney does. So, too, do defendants, who typically pay
outside counsel hourly rates in the hundreds of dollars and must defray
disbursements as well.' 93 Furthermore, if the employee prevails at trial, the
employer will incur liability for his or her attorneys' fees; 194 these can
sometimes amount to hundreds of thousands of dollars. 95 A late settlement
191. See id. at 15-16 (giving Anheuser-Busch, Halliburton, and Johnson & Johnson as
examples of this approach). Typically, firms exclude certain categories of legal claims, such
as those involving ERISA and unemployment and worker's compensation claims. See id. at
15 n.4.
192. See supra text accompanying note 172.
193. See Stallworth et al., supra note 101, at 37 (reporting an estimated cost of more than
$96,000 to defend an individual, non-class-action, discrimination lawsuit). One study found
that, on average, the cost of "a seriously contested employment discrimination case is
$130,000." Ross, supra note 112, at 183. In New York City, I believe, $150,000 would
amount to a more realistic figure.
194. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000).
195. See, e.g., Disabilities: Minnesota, 38 Fair Emp. Prac. Newsl. (BNA) 962 (Dec. 5,
2002) (citing "more than $100,000 in attorneys' fees" awarded in case of disability
discrimination); Retaliation: Seventh Circuit Affirms $400,000 Verdict for Female Pilot
Fired After Complaint Letter, 38 Fair Emp. Prac. Newsl. (BNA) 957 (Sept. 26, 2002)
(noting that $200,000 in attorneys' fees were awarded in case of retaliation for complaining
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will also likely reflect the fact that substantial fees have been incurred to
that point by counsel for the plaintiff. True, workplace mediations may
also require that the company absorb the cost of counsel, to the extent that• 196
complainants desire representation. But that amount should be relatively
trivial compared with post-trial attorneys' fees, even when the latter are
heavily discounted to adjust both for the plaintiffs risk of losing and the
time value of money.
Finally, note that from the perspective of an agency or court, any
conflict that settles before becoming a "case" (and, as we have seen,
mediation generally promotes resolution) is one less item on the docket.1 97
Conversely, even if a suit gets settled during litigation, it will have taken
some chunk of the system's resources as well as the parties'.
In addition to enhancing tangible expenses, delay exacts a human toll.
The slow-moving adversarial process often causes tremendous stress for
the persons involved-in employment disputes, disproportionately for the
complainant. He or she is an individual; the opponent is a business entity.
Yet even a company operates through human agents, 198 some of whom also
experience frustration, anxiety, and trauma.
Like other commentators,' 99 I have found that employment disputes
are virtually always fraught with emotion. When asked to describe his
aims for the mediation process, one of my plaintiffs replied: "To regain my
emotional wholeness." While few actually articulate this wish, many
others undoubtedly feel that the events which triggered their complaint
have dealt grave blows to their self-confidence, trust in others, and
optimistic outlook on life. Work, after all, occupies a central part of our
existence. Most of us spend more waking hours on the job than at home
during the week, and much of our sense of identity and worth is bound up
about sex discrimination); Sex Discrimination: Male Worker Gets Damages for Denial of
Child Care Leave, 38 Fair Emp. Prac. Newsl. (BNA) 956 (Sept. 12, 2002) (describing award
of a $626,000 fee in sex discrimination case). In multi-plaintiff cases, awards can run into
the millions of dollars. See, e.g., Sex Discrimination: Court Approves $47 Million Consent
Decree Settling Sex Bias Allegations at Rent-A-Center, 38 Fair Emp. Prac. Newsl. (BNA)
958 (Oct. 10, 2002) (documenting that $10.5 million in attorneys' fees were awarded in sex
discrimination class action); In Brief: Grocery Chain Pays $10.5 Million, 37 Fair Emp.
Prac. Newsl. (BNA) 914 (Jan. 18, 2001) (reporting that nearly $2.4 million in attorneys'
fees were awarded to group of employees in a race discrimination case).
196. See infra text accompanying note 269.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 115-17.
198. In referring to "parties" and "defendants," I intend, where applicable, to encompass
involved or affected individuals who work for the company--even though the firm is the
sole actual defendant. By contrast to the federal statutes, some state and local anti-
discrimination laws provide for liability of agents under certain circumstances. See Tomka
v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1314-17 (2d Cir. 1995).
199. See, e.g., Kahan & Deem, supra note 117, at 29.
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200with our occupation.
Frequently, too, such negative emotions increase over time. For those
involved in litigation, time definitely does not heal all wounds. The
snail's-pace trek through an alien, hostile, combative environment
heightens feelings of pain, anger, and victimization. Further, if, as is often
true, the employee has been discharged, she may be suffering economically
for at least a part of this period. Even assuming that she secures new
employment, the plaintiff may have lost ground in terms of salary, health
insurance, pension rights, and other benefits, which she may never regain
entirely. These circumstances only enhance bitterness and stress.
One of my cases furnishes a poignant illustration of how time spent
litigating instead of recovering can cast a pall over life. Jerry, a middle-
aged white man with a strong work ethic, was hired by a major utility
company upon his graduation from high school. He started at the bottom
of the ladder, but received promotions over the years. By his mid-thirties,
Jerry was earning a good salary and supporting his wife and children
comfortably. Then he made an error in judgment. Several of his friends
(Italian-American, as is he) had fallen behind in paying their bills and their
service had been cut off; he turned it back on, thereby violating firm policy.
Jerry received no quid pro quo and, when an investigation commenced, he
admitted his misdeeds right away. The company, nonetheless, fired him.
There was evidence that others guilty of worse misconduct had been
retained and that certain members of management considered persons of
Italian extraction to be untrustworthy and "crime prone." Jerry, therefore,
charged the utility with having discriminated against him on the basis of
national origin.
Following his discharge, Jerry's personal life imploded. It took him
over nine months to find a job and several years to reestablish his career, in
another part of the country, and earn money comparable to what he had
made before. During this period, Jerry was forced to declare bankruptcy
and live off the charity of his elderly father. These circumstances
engendered profound humiliation. In addition, his wife divorced him and
took their children back to New York. Jerry suffered a heart attack and
began to experience stomach ulcers.
When I met him, over a decade had elapsed-most of it spent in
ultimately fruitless proceedings before the state human rights division.
While the agency did find probable cause to believe that bias played a role
in his firing, it procured him no relief.2°  So Jerry found himself in court,
200. See Estlund, Changing Workplace, supra note 11, at 338.
201. The defendant moved for an "equitable order" dismissing the complaint, on the
ground that Jerry had declined what it deemed a generous settlement offer of $75,000.
While denying the motion, the agency apparently did nothing to move the case forward; for
some reason, no hearing was ever held. Eventually, the EEOC sent Jerry a notice of right to
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ordered to participate in settlement talks, no nearer to his goals of
restitution and vindication than on the day of his termination, and fearing
that this new development simply augured more delay.
In caucus conversations, Jerry made plain that he blamed the
defendant not only for his financial woes-which by then were long gone,
though etched in acid in his memory-but also for the deterioration in both
his health and marital relations. Jerry could not understand how hard it
would be to prove that the company's actions "caused" the latter, for
purposes of damages. It was equally clear, however, that what he regarded
as the law's false promise had further entrenched his feelings of bitterness
and worsened his emotional state. Even mediation, resulting in a six-figure
monetary settlement, could not put Jerry, still a tragic Humpty Dumpty,
together again. He wrote me the following:
I must inform you how disappointed I am in our system. It took
10 years to "fail" to right a wrong-the whole purpose of our
system's existence. It concerns me that delays and
ineffectiveness in our system must cripple many .... As we
discussed, you never get back the whole cake-but this is just a
crumb and not even a slice. This settlement does not come close
to re-establishing the stability and security I worked 16 years for
and that was wrongfully taken away.
Nonetheless, late as it came, mediation got a positive review: it succeeded
in bringing "a human side to a bureaucratic and cold proceeding."
It is unlikely that any amount of dollars would have reconciled Jerry
to his discharge. Yet, suppose that mediation, under the auspices of the
firm, had taken place right after, or even before, his firing. Perhaps he
could have convinced his employer that termination, whether or not
discriminatory, was overly harsh, and he would have been retained or
reinstated-possibly with a transfer to a different department-with duties
that did not lend themselves to the kind of temptation to which he
succumbed. Alternatively, he might have negotiated one or more of the
following terms: severance pay to tide him over his months of
unemployment; continued benefits, such as insurance; retroactive
resignation in lieu of dismissal; a neutral, if not favorable, reference; and
use of the firm's training or outplacement programs (of special value in the
new workplace). In this scenario, would Jerry's marriage and health have
lasted? We cannot know. But early intervention would surely have
bettered his chances of moving on with life in a less damaged physical and
psychological state.
In addition to playing havoc with body and soul, litigation, and the
concomitant passage of years without resolution of the triggering dispute,
sue. He then filed suit in federal court.
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also tends to make parties "dig in." Having already incurred so many
tangible or intangible costs, they may be, at best, ambivalent about letting
go of the conflict. Even employers, who usually have less of an emotional
investment than employees, may postpone settlement-thus, sending good
money after bad. Also, given the amount of time spent mired in the past,
one or both sides may find it hard to acquiesce in the mediator's plea to
shift their focus to the future.
202
Jerry, for example, endured agony during the mediation session. He
often seemed to reject not just a specific offer, but rather the whole notion
of settling; it was almost as though he could not conceive of living without
the lawsuit. Other plaintiffs I have encountered assert that they want to go
forward with the case in order to "expose" the employer's misdeeds;
unrealistically, for the most part, they believe that the media will subject
the defendant to bad publicity. Still others insist they will feel a sense of
vindication, win or lose, by simply telling their tale to a jury. I sometimes
address this topic by exploring the likelihood of summary judgment, which
would deny them that opportunity. I also ask them to question whether
they will, in fact, gain any satisfaction from a negative verdict. I know of
more than one such plaintiff who lost at trial and was devastated.
Notwithstanding that a good mediator usually can overcome blanket
resistance to settlement, the chance of achieving a creative, integrative
solution fades rapidly with time in employment cases. As mentioned
earlier, nowadays these often involve dismissals of the employee. Even
when he is not discharged, simmering resentment over grievances like non-
promotion or harassment may cause him to reach such a level of frustration
203that he quits.
While legally available, reinstatement ceases to be a practical option
after months, or years, have elapsed since the employee was on the job.
202. Magistrate Judge Edward M. Chen of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California has commented that "[e]mployment cases, as a class, are more difficult
to settle than almost any other that appear on the federal docket." He then proceeds to
explain: "Because the issues are highly personal and because parties are often unwilling to
give up any ground, the cases are often very difficult to resolve even when the[y] should."
Judges Counsel Attorneys to Settle Cases, Deal With Confidentiality, Privacy Concerns, 18
Empl. Discrim. Rep. (BNA) 384, at 384 (Mar. 27, 2000).
203. Even where the worker leaves the job without being fired, he may be able to
establish a case of "constructive discharge." In order to do so, the plaintiff must make the
following showing:
[T]he employer, for discriminatory reasons, and with the intent of forcing the
plaintiff to quit, has either (1) confronted the plaintiff with a choice of resigning
or being fired, (2) rendered the plaintiff's working conditions so difficult or
unpleasant that a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would feel
compelled to resign, or (3) induced the plaintiffs resignation by
misrepresenting a material fact.
MODJESKA, supra note 79, § 1.03, at 1-4 to 1-5 (3d ed. 2002) (footnotes omitted).
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Rarely does the defendant offer, or the plaintiff seek, reinstatement in such
circumstances. My practice starkly illustrates this point. Approximately
ninety-five percent of the employees of private firms whom I have
encountered no longer worked for the defendant-employer. This statistic
contrasts with a mere twenty-five percent of the government worker-
plaintiffs, who enjoy civil service protection from unjustified firing instead
of serving at management's will. None of these plaintiffs, in either the
public or private sector, was rehired; few, I recall, even wanted to be.
Reinstatement aside, "old" cases generally offer little scope for
inventive bargaining. Negotiation generally focuses on purely distributive
damages issues.
To be sure, some modest non-monetary forms of relief crop up upon
occasion-for example: sanitizing a bad record, providing a reference (if the
complainant still requires one), and expressing "regret" for what
occurred. 2°4 An actual apology smacks too much of a confession of "guilt"
for most defendants or their lawyers to stomach, even when the employer
quite clearly did something unfair, if not illegal.
Sometimes, too, the mediator can help the parties deal creatively with
dollars. For instance, the agreement between Derek and the law firm that
failed to hire him stipulated that a portion of the money would go to a
charity of Derek's choice in the name of Morris, the senior partner. Other
cases have culminated in structured settlements of various kinds, taking
account of the participants' needs with respect to taxation °5 and other
matters. In addition, when making a mediator's proposal of a compromise
solution, I try to light on a sum that has particular meaning for at least one
party. As an illustration, where an employee was denied a promotion, I
picked an otherwise "ballpark" number that equated to the marginal
amount she would have earned had she gotten the promotion and then quit
two years later-as in fact she did-to become a full-time mother.
Contrary to what lawyers frequently say to the mediator, it is never "just
about money;" psychology counts.
Nonetheless it remains true that early mediation holds considerably
more promise of specific, not purely monetary, relief. To some degree, this
phenomenon is due to another harmful effect of litigation and delay: their
204. See Baar & Zody, supra note 133, at 32; Yelnosky, supra note 56, at 602 n.116.
205. Since 1996, however, virtually all damages in employment cases must be included
in gross income and are subject to taxation; allocation of monetary sums in settlement
agreements generally cannot avoid this consequence. See generally Laura Sager & Stephen
Cohen, How the Income Tax Undermines Civil Rights Law, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075 (2000).
Most tax bargaining, therefore, focuses on whether the defendant will give the plaintiff a
"W-2" or "1099" form. As the former involves withholding by the employer, plaintiffs
would rather use the latter. In my experience, most defendants will agree to "1099" all or
part of the money.
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tendency to lessen mediation's ability to salvage or repair relationships. °6
Association between the employer and the ex-employee has ordinarily
long since ended by the time litigation ensues: °7 mutual commitment has
been replaced by mutual distrust. In such an atmosphere, parties often will
not risk agreeing to terms that, unlike an immediate payment, take time to
fulfill or entail some subjectivity in judging performance. Thus, for
example, even where the plaintiff is still unemployed, I have had trouble
"selling" outplacement or training programs run by the firm. Doubting the
employer's good faith, the employee usually prefers to walk away with
cash in hand; and although the company can furnish "in kind" benefits
relatively cheaply, it may well be disinclined to renew contact with the
plaintiff. Indeed in some cases, workplace mediation alone, very soon after
a problem's onset, can salvage parties' personal connections since "[o]ften,
when an employee is suffering disappointment, anxiety, and emotional
stress from a work-related incident, the employer's failure to take prompt
action is perceived as further evidence of a non-caring attitude. 208
Despite the many considerations favoring early mediation, lawyers
may recommend postponement until discovery has been completed. This
position has some validity. Litigants need enough knowledge to evaluate
their case with reasonable confidence; discovery, however, not only
increases delay and expense, it also tends to harden positions. That is
particularly true with respect to party depositions. Fortunately, the choice
need not be all or nothing. Where it seems advisable, counsel may engage
209in a limited pre-mediation exchange of basic information and documents.
In addition, during the mediation process, the mediator will often
encourage informal disclosure.10 If it becomes clear that more elaborate
discovery is required, the mediator can always suspend negotiations for this
purpose. Having already entered the picture, he or she has the ability to
hold the participants' feet to the fire so that talks resume within a
reasonable time, without a total loss of settlement momentum.
But perhaps most to the point, routine on-the-job mediation, available,
as I recommend, for any and all workplace disputes, will likely implicate
few incipient causes of action. At this stage, too, the relevant facts should
be easily accessible. Handled early, the controversy need not mushroom in
complexity. Lastly, to the extent that litigation concerns do contraindicate
206. See Mayer, supra note 44, at 163.
207. The mediator should, nevertheless, make an attempt to repair the relationship. Even
where the employee no longer is working for the employer, the parties may benefit from
such efforts. See infra note 211.
208. See Evans & Sloan, supra note 11, at 768.
209. In federal court, the parties must make early disclosure of certain basic information
without awaiting a discovery request. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1).
210. Occasionally, brokering discovery agreements takes almost as much of the
mediator's time and effort as settling the underlying substantive claims.
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prompt mediation, these must be weighed against the advantages of curing
the problem as soon as possible. I believe that most employees would
rather have a bird in the hand than two in the bush: that is, a quick and
specific remedy, such as an immediate transfer, shift change, or upgraded
evaluation, rather than the hope of money damages sometime in the
indefinite future.
This being said, I want to make clear my view that even late
mediations are, ordinarily, better than none. The settlements that they often
produce can remove the stress of litigation and yield psychological closure.
At times, the parties may come to regard each other in a friendlier light, in
retrospect,21' thus replenishing the energy wasted for so long on negative
feelings.
Still, I conclude where I began: the passage of time, with its
accompanying switch in focus from human problems to legal issues,
squanders much of mediation's potential value. That is especially true
because employment claims must usually be articulated in terms of
invidious discrimination, an accusation that "raises the temperature" of the
dispute and "puts the moral reputation of the employer and its agents on the
line.
,212
2. Broad-Gauged Mediation
I have argued that mediation not only ought to be promptly held, but
also should be plenary in scope, encompassing virtually all employment-
related issues instead of dealing solely with claims of violations of legal
rights-which, in general, boil down to complaints of unlawful bias. As
previously noted, my contention presupposes access to workplace
mediation since courts and human rights agencies can only deal with the
matter on their dockets: that is, a charge of discrimination. While some
employers do offer broad-gauged schemes of the type I favor, others
(notably, the mammoth USPS) limit theirs to allegations of denial of equal
employment opportunity.
Put simply, such a restriction is less than optimal; worse, it may be
counterproductive. A variety of reasons support my conclusion. First,
consider that employment discrimination claims are meeting with an
increasingly skeptical, if not downright cynical, response. Surveys
211. One of my cases affords a heart-warming illustration of this phenomenon. Sarah, a
college administrator, had been dismissed a few months after a breast cancer diagnosis. She
responded by filing a discrimination complaint on the basis of disability. So constructive
was the dialogue between the parties in mediation that the defendant proposed as one of the
settlement terms an annual fund-raising "run for the cure," which it would sponsor in
Sarah's name. Needless to say, Sarah accepted the offer with alacrity.
212. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge, supra note 42, at 1680.
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conducted by federal circuit court task forces on gender, racial, and ethnic
bias report that a significant number of district judges believe these cases
occupy an unwarranted amount of judicial time and, in the main, lack any
merit.213 Indeed, if one equates merit with provability, these naysayers may
be correct. As noted earlier, second-generation discrimination is often
subtle or even unconscious and, hence, frequently resists efforts to
demonstrate unlawful intent. 14
This disaffection plays out, moreover, against a backdrop of growing
hostility to what many people regard as a generally excessive solicitude for
minorities. With respect to race, for example, the deepest fault line in our
society, Howard Gadlin, an ombudsperson at the National Institutes of
Health, writes:
These days, most whites believe, racism is the exception ....
While there is some acknowledgement of institutional racism,
most whites seem to believe at the same time that there is a
preference for people of color; it is they who have the advantage
when it comes to admission to schools or applications for
employment.2 1 5
Like views have been expressed about other protected groups. The
attitudes in question, blatant or latent, have surfaced in judicial opinions216
and laws217 rejecting affirmative action in various settings, as well as in
academic writings 18 and the popular media.21 9
Although I do not share the perspective described by Gadlin, I do
agree that it is widespread. 220 As a kind of "background noise," it probably
213. See Yelnosky, supra note 56, at 593 n.64. In discussions with both lawyers and lay
persons in recent years, I have heard many more expressions of a jaundiced view of such
complaints than I did formerly.
214. See Silver, supra note 46, at 532.
215. Howard Gadlin, Conflict Resolution, Cultural Differences, and the Culture of
Racism, 10 NEGOTIATION.J. 33,40 (1994); see McGinley, Cronyism, supra note 38, at 1029.
216. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (holding
that all racial classifications, including those designed to help minority contractors, must be
subjected to strict scrutiny); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 962 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding
that state university's law school admissions program violated equal protection because it
discriminated in favor of minority applicants), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996). As this
article went to press, the Supreme Court upheld minority admissions procedures at the
University of Michigan in the abstract. The precise formulae used to advance minority
applicants, however, failed strict scrutiny review. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. _ (2003).
217. See, e.g., California Civil Rights Initiative (Proposition 209), CAL. CONST. art. I, §
31 (forbidding use of any preference based on race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin).
218. See, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992).
219. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ROOSTER'S EGG 42-56 (1995) (relating examples of
the attitude that minorities are given too much preferential treatment in America, as
expressed by popular radio personalities such as Howard Stern).
220. See, e.g., Silver, supra note 46, at 490-91.
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contributes to negative, albeit unconscious, feelings about particular
employees' claims, making it hard for judges and jurors to "hear" and
credit plaintiffs' narratives and draw inferences against the defendant.
Such underground bias-or simple absence of understanding, where similar
life experience is lacking-may lead to failures to recognize valid, though
hard to prove, grievances. Further, to the extent that adverse job actions
seem, even to the sensitive observer, not to be due to discrimination, future
complainants will confront yet tougher obstacles. To paraphrase United
States Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson: "It must prejudice the
occasional meritorious [discrimination complaint] ... to be buried in a
flood of worthless ones. He who must search a haystack for a needle is
likely to end up with the attitude that the needle is not worth the search. 22'
Otherwise put, an overall lack of success in suits, from whatever cause, will
only reinforce the notion that most plaintiffs are merely disgruntled
employees-not the victims of employer prejudice.
My present concern, though, is less with the litigation problems of job
discrimination claims than with the counterproductive effects that
"racializing and genderizing everything" 222 and, by extension, viewing
every conflict involving a member of a protected class through the lens of
forbidden bias, can have on the workplace. Companies designing internal
ADR programs should take these effects into account when making the
initial, critical choice whether to target solely allegations of prejudice or, as
I urge, establish a process that deals comprehensively with employment-
connected disputes.
What, then, are the potentially bad results of too narrow a focus on
race or other statutory classifications? For one thing, some firms may treat
employees who fall under these rubrics with kid gloves, accepting
performance or behavior not countenanced in other employees. The
perceived need for "strategic" tolerance, whether or not reasonably based,
will alienate some employers from those groups which most need, and
deserve, to have their careers fostered. 223 To be sure, the laws themselves
224may tend to produce this type of reaction. But while the structure of an
221. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in result,
discussing prisoners' petitions for habeas corpus); see Mayer, supra note 44, at 156 (noting
impatience with complainants who "cry wolf').
222. Howard Gadlin, Remarks, Mediation in the Administrative Hearing Process: How
Effective Is It For Formal Complaints of Discrimination?, a program at the ABA Dispute
Resolution Section Meeting, Apr. 6, 2002.
223. Employers may restrict their hiring of employees in protected classes, in order to
forestall litigation by workers who might later become disaffected or be dismissed. See
Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 40, at 1027; Estlund, Wrongful Discharge, supra note
42, at 1680 (endorsing the Donohue & Siegelman argument).
224. See Estlund, Wrongful Discharge, supra note 42, at 1657 ("The operation of
antidiscrimination law against an at-will background may tend to set in motion
counterproductive incentives and tensions among employers and different groups of
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in-house program cannot eliminate all undesirable employer conduct
influenced by fears of liability, it can, at least, avoid enhancing
preoccupation with such concerns.
More sweepingly, as workers with grievances are encouraged to see
themselves as victims of discrimination and their complaints (even in very
marginal cases) as group-related rather than the result of "garden-variety
unfairness," '225 workforce cohesion and the working environment will
226deteriorate. Ironically, prospective plaintiffs may suffer most from
efforts to fit all job disputes into the Procrustean bed of discrimination.
Accentuating divisive categories like ethnicity, disability, race, and religion
may boomerang, causing resentment in co-workers as well as employers.
Majority workers quite often regard their protected colleagues as
oversensitive individuals who demand and receive "special treatment"
undeservedly.227 Listening to plaintiffs in mediation, I have noticed that
some are, indeed, more thin-skinned in certain ways than their cohorts. For
example, African-Americans tend to be touchy if asked to perform what
they perceive as menial chores, such as washing a supervisor's car at the
228job site. But how much sensitivity is too much? Fellow workers may
not understand where the complainant "is coming from," in terms of past
229experience with bias 2-how little empathy is too little? A New York
Times survey exposed a Rashomon-like gap between blacks' and whites'
opinions regarding workplace race relations: of the African-Americans
polled, twenty-four percent responded that relations were generally bad; of
the Caucasians, a mere six percent agreed.230 In the same vein, I daresay
majority employees detect "special treatment" of minorities considerably
more than do the latter.
But whatever the objective reality (if it could even be determined), I
employees.")
225. Id. at 1679.
226. Cf. Schultz, supra note 11, at 1885-86 (suggesting that, in the face of
discrimination, feminists must move beyond identity politics).
227. See Estlund, Wrongful Discharge, supra note 42, at 1679.
228. In one mediation in which I was involved, the complainant took umbrage at her
employer's request that she open all of the office doors when she arrived at work in the
morning. At her own instance, this employee had been given a schedule that had her
arriving hours earlier than others.
229. See, e.g., Stallworth et al., supra note 101, at 41 (noting that often discrimination
claim is based on plaintiff's broader perception of being discriminated against, as well as on
present controversy).
230. Simon J. Nadel, Diversity: Workplace Arrangment [sic] in White and Black: Race
Relations Affect Productivity, Litigation, 16 Empl. Discrim. Rep. (BNA) 666 (May 9, 200 1)
(quoting Kevin Sack & Janet Elder, Poll Finds Optimistic Outlook But Enduring Racial
Division, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2000, at Al). An earlier Gallup Poll asked if blacks were
treated less fairly on the job than whites: 45% of black respondents, but only 14% of white
ones, answered affirmatively. The Gallup Org., Black/White Relations in the United States
(June 10, 1997).
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return to the same conclusion: "naming, blaming, and claiming" bias23" ' at
every turn will not improve the workplace climate. Let me be clear: I do
not imply that anyone should turn a blind eye to discrimination. Employers
must take serious measures to prevent and cure it, and workers must remain
free to allege it. My argument is simply that employees ought not be
forced to claim discrimination--or nothing.
Apart from the deleterious effects already mentioned, such a policy
denies those workers faced with non-bias related issues their best forum for
a resolution. To quote a recent publication of the Center for Public
Resources Institute for Dispute Resolution (CPR): "The fact that these
[workplace] conflicts raise non-legal problems makes them no less
important to the employee, and thus no less serious as management
concerns."
232
Focusing solely on discrimination can also pit protected groups
against each other. I have had a number of cases in which, for example,
African-American women contended that bosses treated Latinas better, or
African-American men complained that white females were given
promotions ahead of them. In one instance, a woman from India alleged
that the company's salary structure favored whites, Latinas, and blacks.
Instead of promoting divisive inter-group comparisons, why not let
employees aggrieved by a hostile environment, lack of advancement, or
low pay make these claims directly? If mediation talks reveal that some
workers are, in fact, being disadvantaged on a class basis, management has
the obligation to right the wrong for all affected employees, not just the
charging party. Thus, opening the door to every type of workplace issue
does not preclude dealing forcefully with any bias actually encountered.
Attaching the label "discrimination" to all workplace disagreements
can, in addition, impede resolution. In a perhaps ironic tribute to the
success of civil rights laws in teaching that prejudice is truly wrong,
individual defendants are frequently outraged at being accused of conduct
so condemned by society. In one case, supervisors named by the plaintiff
in her Title VII complaint were so incensed by the allegations of race-based
harassment that they categorically refused to attend talks with her. Since
employees usually enter mediation with strong negative feelings, which
will need to be alleviated or redirected in order to achieve settlement,
adding employer anger to the stew just exacerbates the problem.
The most difficult emotional dynamic, in my experience, arises in
mediations involving small companies, many of them family-owned.
Typically, the "boss" herself appears at the mediation proceedings. This
individual tends to regard the worker's complaint as a personal affront.
231. Gadlin, supra note 222.
232. CPR INSnTUTE, supra note I 1 i, at 27.
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She frequently knows the plaintiff well, views him as difficult, and believes
that she went beyond the call of duty to accommodate him before finally
firing him. His "ingratitude ' 233 makes the defendant feel betrayed or,
worse still, the victim of an attempt to extort her hard-earned money. In
contrast to Megamerger, Inc., the small firm will not have deep pockets or
copious paper documentation supporting its position.234 The controversy
may, thus, boil down to a credibility contest ("He says, she says"), which
often further embitters the parties by eliciting mutual charges of lying.
In this context, injecting the issue of discrimination into an already
volatile dispute virtually ensures that resentment on both sides will pose a
formidable barrier to settlement. 235 In a common reaction to the mediator's
reminder of litigation costs, the defendant will insist that while she is happy
to pay her own lawyer, she refuses to give anything to the plaintiff:
"Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute!, 236 Simply stated, bias
allegations can turn an easily resolvable conflict into an intractable
quagmire.
Yet another downside to a system that rewards interpreting run-of-the-
mill workplace squabbles as instances of discrimination is its tendency to
lead workers to ignore ways in which their own performance or conduct
may have led to their predicament. As one company lawyer harshly, but
aptly, characterized a plaintiff: "She's a woman with job problems who
basically said: 'It must be because I'm Asian."' Too ready recourse to
allegations of race, religion, ethnicity, disability, gender, or age
discrimination compounds the human predilection to blame others for
personal failings. In the end, a complainant who does so will probably both
have lost her suit, if she went to court, and more important, let slip a
valuable opportunity to learn from the experience, however bitter. An
employee who fails to face her performance issues is one who will likely
neither improve nor advance.
By the same token, a narrow focus on defending against a charge of
unlawful discrimination often diverts the employer from addressing actions
by its management that-although probably legal-were, nevertheless, ill-
advised. This blinkered approach not only impedes constructive change
but also may convince the plaintiff that the defendant's sole concern is
shielding itself from liability rather than doing the right thing. I have found
233. A frequent defense refrain is "No good deed goes unpunished."
234. Small companies may resist instituting what they regard as overly bureaucratic
processes like a progressive disciplinary system, with documentation at every stage.
Ordinarily, though, they become more willing to do so after having learned the hard way-
by being sued.
235. See supra text accompanying note 212.
236. THE HOME BOOK OF QUOTATIONs 63 (Burton Stevenson ed., 10th ed. 1967)
(concluding that Rep. Robert G. Harper of South Carolina is the author of this June 1798
retort to French perfidy).
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that even in cases with little or no evidence of bias, more often than not the
employer contributed to the employee's problem or, at least, did not make
sufficient effort to resolve it.
Recall, for example, Jerry's debacle. By terminating him for an
admittedly misguided attempt to restore his friends' electricity service-
after sixteen otherwise-stainless years on the job-his employer
overreacted, as even its own lawyer conceded in caucus. Another one of
my mediations involved Dahlia, a nurse of Indian national origin. Just after
her return from a lengthy sick leave, her hospital employer reassigned this
elderly, nervous woman from familiar duty on the pediatric ward to the
emergency room. While the hospital did nothing illegal, 3' it surely acted
unwisely: Dahlia, predictably, could not handle this new, stressful job.
Worse still, the employer refused, for no good reason, to give her back her
former job, at which she excelled. She finally regained it, following many
unhappy months, through a settlement brokered in mediation.
Furthermore, in several cases I have handled, employers had fired the
employees on their first day back from a sickness or maternity leave-thus,
fairly inviting the latter to regard the dismissal as based upon impermissible
grounds, such as pregnancy or disability, even if, in fact, it was not. In
many instances, moreover, employers have tolerated heavy-handed, inept,
or downright nasty managers.
Finally, to the extent a complaint of discrimination amounts to a
conscious end-run around the strictures of at-will employment, the plaintiff
assumes the false position of making a claim that she strongly suspects is
specious. Joan, for example, stated during the mediation that she "no
longer" believed her former supervisor had acted as he did because she was
black. Later, however, she frankly admitted to me in caucus that she had
"had to" allege prejudice in order to get her grievance heard. Another
incident involved a complainant who, also in caucus, revealed that she
thought the real obstacle to her advancement was not her sex but rather the
fact that she had served under eight managers in thirteen years. These two
cases are hardly unique.
I surmise that a fair number of employees-at least at the time they
file their charges-harbor doubts about the truth of their complaint of
discrimination. Whatever employers might think, moreover, I suspect that
few plaintiffs feel comfortable consciously making dishonest claims.
237. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6
(codified in scattered sections of Titles 2, 5, 29, and 40 U.S.C.). This law generally requires
that workers be given up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave in a twelve-month period to care
for themselves or a close relative during an illness. On return from FMLA leave, the
employee is entitled to be placed in the same position she previously held or in an
equivalent one. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a) (2000); 5 C.F.R. § 630.1208 (2002). In the particular
circumstances, the transfer did not violate Dahlia's FMLA rights.
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Regardless of their beliefs at the outset, during the course of litigation the
employees usually succeed in convincing themselves of the veracity of
their account and suppressing alternative reasons for their problems, such
as personality conflicts, inadequate performance, or unsatisfactory
workplace conditions.238
Fooling oneself, though, is only marginally better than trying to fool
others. And whether or not the employee has actually acted in bad faith,
employers greet with great skepticism allegations, not atypical, of three or
more different types of statutory violation. The most I have seen,
numerically, is five; 23 9 the most unlikely, substantively, was a claim based
on the worker's gender, Lutheran religion, and grandparents' Latvian
national origin! Scattershot charges ordinarily add up to less than the sum
of their parts. While some "intersectional' '24 complaints make sense,241 the
fact remains that many do not. If there is any credible portion, like sex
bias, in the case just mentioned, it gets diluted, lost in the crowd, or tainted
by association.
Some of the arguments same I propound have influenced others,
Professor Cynthia L. Estlund for one, to urge replacement of the prevailing
at-will environment with a regime barring dismissal except for cause,
238. A stark example of this phenomenon that I encountered in mediation involved two
employees dismissed for facilitating theft of company property (copper wire) by a third
person, the brother of one of them. Both African-Americans, the plaintiffs contended that
they did not commit the offense and would not have been terminated had they been white;
they pointed to certain racist remarks made over the years by their supervisor. Observed in
the act in a "sting" operation staffed by black security officers, they were clearly guilty-as,
indeed, an arbitrator and the EEOC had already found. Not surprisingly, the latter had
obtained evidence that the employer discharged people of all races whom they reasonably
suspected of stealing. The workers, nonetheless, appeared sincerely outraged at their
treatment and, at times, were even tearful. I was amazed that they could seemingly feel so
victimized. They may have reasoned: "It's a rich company," or "Everyone takes a bit of
wire." In their eyes, the salient wrong was likely the way they were treated on the job.
239. Such blunderbuss charges occasionally appear in reported cases. See, e.g., Ray v.
Trans States Airlines, Inc., No. 4:01-CV-93 (CEJ), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22658 (E.D. Mo.
Oct. 10, 2002) (granting summary judgment to employer where employee alleged
harassment based on race, religion, gender, national origin, and color). For a federal judge's
reaction to complaints like these, see Michael Bologna, Judges Warn Employment Lawyers
Against Motions for Dismissal, Summary Judgment, 19 Empl. Discrim. Rep. (BNA) 595
(Dec. 4, 2002) (quoting Judge Ruben Castillo, federal district court judge in the N.D. Ill.,
who criticized plaintiffs' lawyers "for filing wide-ranging claims alleging discrimination on
multiple levels-a strategy akin to 'throwing a plate of spaghetti at the wall to see what
sticks."').
240. See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241 (1991).
241. In de facto segregated job environments--e.g., elderly, female, Catholic, Latina
employees doing piece work in a garment factory, supervised by a young, Protestant,
Caucasian male-I have encountered plausible allegations of bias based on the totality of
the workers' traits.
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absent a knowing and voluntary waiver of the worker's rights.242 Such a
change would drastically alter the present law, which ordinarily lets the
employer escape liability even after firing an employee for an illegitimate
reason-for instance, in order to permit the boss to supplant him with a less
qualified cro 243 so long as this reason does not amount to statutorily
forbidden bias.
Such a reform would have the advantage of elevating the level of
candor in employment litigation. The employee would no longer need to
turn a forthright allegation of unfair discharge into a marginal, and likely
unprovable, charge of discriminatory firing. Of course, nothing would
prevent a complainant from mounting an accusation of bias when he has
the grounds to do so. This proposed change might, in addition, alleviate
tensions between members of protected groups and their fellow workers,
who-except through unionization-have no recourse against unjustified
244termination. Yet enacting "just cause" legislation would also entail some
disadvantages: for instance, making it much harder, as in the case of
unionized workplaces, to get rid of non-performers. 5
We are, however, most unlikely to see the demise of at-will
246employment any time soon-if, indeed, ever. And even if we were, this
reform would not help workers to the extent that they have grievances other
than unfair termination. I will, therefore, continue to discuss dispute
resolution in the context of the current laws governing employment, turning
now to a detailed examination of workplace-based mediation.
III. MEDIATION IN THE WORKPLACE: POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS AND BEST
PRACTICES
Thus far, I have contended that mediation of employment conflicts is
generally salutary and, as compared with litigation, definitely preferable.
In addition, I have argued for early mediation, which largely translates into
mediation on the job, extending to all, or virtually all, employment-related
controversies, not just to alleged discrimination. Promptness and unlimited
242. See Estlund, Wrongful Discharge, supra note 42, at 1657.
243. See id. at 1671 ("When liability depends on proof of a particular bad reason for
discharge, 'no reason' or even a demonstrably false or fabricated reason is good enough for
the employer to escape liability."); McGinley, Cronyism, supra note 38, at 1022. But cf.
Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 587 (1st Cir. 1999) ("[A] court, at
the summary judgment stage, may [not] accept uncritically an employer's articulation of
cronyism as an explanation for its actions.").
244. See Estlund, Wrongful Discharge, supra note 42, at 1657.
245. Discussion of the merits of just-cause versus at-will systems is beyond the scope of
this article.
246. Cf. Mayer, supra note 44, at 170 (observing that establishment of a universal just-
cause standard and elimination of laws forbidding discrimination are not practical).
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access, therefore, constitute two fundamental best practices in this area.
It has been suggested, however, that restricting an ADR program's
stated jurisdiction to complaints of discrimination need not narrow the
scope of the actual proceeding. For example, respecting REDRESS, CPR
notes that even though a postal worker initiates the process by getting in
touch with an equal employment opportunity specialist, "in practice the
claims addressed under the program are not [so] limited., 247 This accords
with my own experience. Indeed, in all of my non-workplace mediations, I
try to deal with the parties' concerns as problems rather than causes of
action. Occasionally, this "pure" mediation approach works very well-
resulting in productive dialogue and some degree of both empowerment
and recognition.
Yet, as I have previously remarked, once the parties resort to the
EEOC or the courts (especially the latter), it is much harder to get them to
take a broad, integrative, non-legalistic, and interest-based approach to
their differences rather than a narrow, distributive position. I also strongly
believe in the value, pragmatic and moral, of "truth in charging." Thus,
while I support mediation in any guise, I continue to believe that access to
it should not be conditioned on the filing of a discrimination complaint, nor
should its content even nominally be constrained by pressure to adhere to
an equal employment opportunity agenda.
Best practices for employer-sponsored mediation can most usefully be
considered by reference to two fundamental objections to ADR. I view the
topics as interwoven, since one can persuasively respond to the criticisms
by structuring mediation programs in ways that satisfactorily address both
248
of them. These global dissents from ADR, and the responses to them,
occupy a considerable number of pages in the professional literature; I need
not rehash them in depth here. First, some critics believe that the
247. CPR INSTITUTE, supra note 11l, at 18. According to a USCS representative: "Often
what presents as a discrimination complaint is not really that." Remarks at In-House ADR
Open House, a program at the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., May 23, 2001
[hereinafter ADR Open House] (unpaginated). Yet, the Customs program, like REDRESS at
the USPS, still purports to cover only equal employment opportunity complaints. See, e.g.,
Jerome T. Barrett & Hugh D. Jascourt, ADR in the Federal Government, ACRESOLUTION,
Winter 2003, at 26, 27 ("[M]any employees use the EEOC procedure to seek relief even if
their case has nothing to do with EEO fights or protections."); Lauren B. Edelman et al.,
Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 497, 511 (1993) (noting that complaint handlers in employer ADR programs
often recast "allegations of fights violations ... as typical managerial problems").
248. See, e.g., Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359; Owen M. Fiss,
Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative:
Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991). See also Christine Rack,
Negotiated Justice: Gender & Ethnic Minority Bargaining Patterns in the Metrocourt Study,
20 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 211,216-17 (1999); Yelnosky, supra note 56, at 604-08.
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informality of ADR "disadvantages 'weaker' parties" (often, women and
members of minorities), whereas the "formality of adversarial adjudication
deters prejudice" and serves to even the balance of power.24 9 The second
argument is that ADR "deflects energy away from collective action" and
"promotes law without justice., 250
With respect to the first contention, I agree that, in certain settings and
in certain classes of cases, the disparity of power between the disputants
will be so great as to militate against mediation. 251 For example, domestic
violence situations inherently pose so serious a danger of exploitation of
the victimized party (usually a woman) that many mediation programs
252exclude these wholly from their purview. Furthermore, as a mediator, I
would decline or withdraw from individual matters where I perceived that a
participant was laboring under a disability, such as mental retardation or
severe emotional illness, that might impede him from understanding or
protecting his interests. 25' This reservation would naturally apply whether
or not the conflict arose in a workplace context.
Focusing on employment mediations generally, I believe that they do
entail some power imbalance in favor of defendants. By statutory
definition, the employer must have a minimum of fifteen employees under
Title VII254 and the ADA155 or twenty under the ADEA;256 most corporate
defendants are many times larger. The plaintiff is usually a single person.
Also, the company frequently profits from being a "repeat player" in
257 258mediation ' and from its ability to hire superior legal assistance. That
being said, I see no reason to assume that most such mediations suffer from
249. Delgado et al., supra note 248, at 1391, 1388. See generally Vivian Wiseman &
Jean Poitras, Mediation Within a Hierarchical Structure: How Can It Be Done
Successfully?, 20 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 51 (2002) (addressing the balance of power issue).
250. Delgado et al., supra note 248, at 1391.
251. See Mori Irvine, Mediation: Is it Appropriate for Sexual Harassment Grievances?,
9 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 27, 27-28 (1993). But cf Kahan & Deem, supra note 117, at
29-30 (positing that mediation is effective at equalizing balance of power).
252. That is the policy of Safe Horizon, which runs the Manhattan and Brooklyn
Mediation Center programs where I volunteer as a mediator. See Irvine, supra note 251, at
27-28 (advocating that complaints of sexual harassment not be handled in mediation).
253. ADA Mediation Guidelines, 2 CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFLICT RESOL., § I(D)(4)
(2001) ("If, despite support, a party lacks capacity to participate in the mediation, mediation
should not proceed unless a surrogate participates in the process to represent the interests of
the party and make the mediation decisions in place of the party."), at
http://www.cardozojcr.com/ada.html (last visited May 14, 2003).
254. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000).
255. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2000).
256. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2000).
257. See Gary LaFree & Christine Rack, The Effects of Participants' Ethnicity and
Gender on Monetary Outcomes in Mediated and Adjudicated Civil Cases, 30 LAw & Soc'Y
REV. 767, 768-69 (1996).
258. See supra text accompanying note 82.
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259crippling inequalities. I say "assume" because of the dearth of empirical
studies focusing on the existence or effects of the power differential in
employment cases. 260 The average worker hardly stands in the same
position in relation to her firm as the average victim of spousal violence
stands in relation to her abuser.
And to the extent that there are inequalities with adverse impacts, one
must ask: "Compared to what?" Many critics of ADR indulge in the
fantasy of "litigation romanticism,, 26' failing to consider the ways in which
formal adversarial proceedings, in courts or agencies, handicap the weaker
party-often, to a much greater degree. However unfairly she may have
been treated, the employee, as we have noted, often lacks a viable
discrimination claim that will survive legal scrutiny. Even if she does have
such a claim, and even with adequate representation, the plaintiff's side
may well be outgunned by a stronger defendant with the resources to cause
delay and inflate expenses. In addition, the employee may have pressing
financial needs. Getting a swift, if typically non-monetary, remedy for
workplace problems while still on the job may present a more welcome
alternative to the complainant than rolling the litigation dice in hopes of
obtaining sizable damages years later. The supposed benefits of litigation
count for little if the plaintiff cannot stay the course. Accordingly, "[i]n an
imperfect world, mediation with its own imperfections begins to look
better.,
262
But most important, companies that wish to adopt best practices can,
and should, design their mediation programs so as to level the playing field
quite substantially. For one thing, firms may choose to subsidize the
neutral's fees and administrative costs. Many do, in whole or in part.
That is certainly appropriate, especially with regard to those employees not
259. In light of the expense of litigation, many employers feel pressured to settle for
nuisance value. See Mayer, supra note 44, at 156; see also Silver, supra note 46, at 542-43
(noting that employers who have not discriminated may make concessions to employees in
mediated settlements). But cf Yelnosky, supra note 56, at 603 (finding that high respondent
satisfaction rates in EEOC mediations "suggest employers were not unduly pressured to
settle baseless charges.").
260. One article that reports findings on operation of dispute resolution mechanisms for
female workers does not, however, deal with mediation. See generally Patricia A.
Gwartney-Gibbs & Denise H. Lach, Research Report: Workplace Dispute Resolution and
Gender Inequality, 7 NEGOTIATION J. 187 (1991).
261. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and
Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2669 (1995).
262. Gunning, supra note 133, at 67.
263. See CPR INSTITUTE, supra note 111, at 20 (giving PaineWebber, Johnson &
Johnson, and Masco Corp. as examples of companies that cover all mediation expenses); id.
app. G at 264 (highlighting Masco Corp.'s policy of paying all mediation expenses).
264. See id. at 19 (giving as examples Halliburton and General Electric Co., where
company pays all but $50).
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265receiving high salaries.
An even more salient equalizer would be counsel for the
266complainant. Thus, the company should allow the employee to have an
attorney represent him in the mediation session and any related
261negotiations. Yet that minimalist approach does not help the employee
who wants, but cannot afford, a lawyer. At this early stage, counsel would
likely reject a contingent fee arrangement; if the matter is promptly settled,
the client will typically obtain little or no money. 68 To address this
problem, some employers offer legal assistance plans that pay for all or
most of the worker's legal expenses in mediation, 69 but most companies
require employees to pay their own legal coStS. 270 In an interesting wrinkle,
the General Electric Company conditions its offer of monetary aid on the
mediation's success. 271  Depending on one's enthusiasm for achieving
settlements, one might view this strategy as a useful incentive or as a form
of undue pressure. Finally, there are firms that give half a loaf of
equalization: while declining to finance employees' counsel, they do not
272bring their own lawyer to the table unless the complainant is represented.
Since power imbalance is surely greatest in cases of lopsided
265. At CSFB, employees earning at least $250,000 pay more than the $150 filing fee
paid by other employees. See id. at 19; cf id. at 20 (describing how mediator's fees and
costs are shared by the parties at Texaco, but the employee is not liable for more than a
day's base pay).
266. See generally Lamont Stallworth, Behind the Eight Ball: The Unrepresented
Claimant and Employment Dispute Resolution, ACRESOLUTION, Spring 2002, at 26.
267. See CPR INSTITUTE, supra note 11, app. G at 262 (excerpting Johnson &
Johnson's company manual showing that plaintiff's lawyer is allowed to be present). See
generally Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR) (now Association for
Conflict Resolution), Guidelines for Voluntary Mediation Programs Instituted by Agencies
Charged with Enforcing Workplace Rights § III (Jan. 24, 1998) [hereinafter Guidelines for
Voluntary Mediation] ("Disputants should have right to choose to be accompanied in
mediation by the advisor of their choice."), at
http://www.acresolution.org/research.nsf/key/guideadleretal (last visited May 12, 2003).
268. See CPR INSTITUTE, supra note 111, at 27 ("[D]isputes involving incumbent
employees usually focus on workplace relationships and other noneconomic issues .... ").
Conceivably, counsel might enter the case in the hope that it will not settle in mediation but
rather will grow into a fee-generating lawsuit. If counsel permits such a motivation to
sabotage the mediation, he will have breached his ethical duty to the client-whose interests
may very well lie in settling early. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.7(b) (1983)
("[A] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation ... may be materially
limited ... by the personal interest of the lawyer [unless] ... the lawyer reasonably believes
that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each
client ... [and the] client gives informed consent.")
269. See CPR INSTITUTE, supra note 11, at 20-21 (offering Shell, Halliburton, and
Philip Moris as examples.).
270. See id. at 20.
271. See id. at2l.
272. See id. at 20 n.5.
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273representation, I prefer the "both or neither" approach to counsel to a
system that tolerates unilateral legal support. This type of asymmetry also
creates difficulties for the mediator. If he attempts to compensate for the
inequality by assisting the employee, he risks the loss, real or perceived, of
his neutrality.274  Despite disclaimers, the worker will tend to see the
neutral as her own attorney; and if the mediator is not careful, so will the
employer. Further, any evaluative statements by the mediator may exert an
undue influence on the complainant. But if he does not make such
statements, the employee may fail to comprehend her options, harbor
unrealistic opinions respecting the merits of her claim, or view the process
as unfair.275
The best practice, however, would be for the firm to provide the whole
loaf (or most of it) and subsidize mediation counsel for employees, at least
up to a reasonable amount. While large companies will generally find
these costs easier to bear than small ones, even the latter might deem it
advisable to take this approach when they compare the relatively modest
outlay required for mediation with the expenses of litigation.
Significantly, the adverse effects of a power imbalance are not the
only considerations. Although an employer might intuitively hesitate to
foster worker representation, the CPR study states that program
administrators feel no such reluctance. 276  They believe: "[T]he
involvement of competent plaintiffs counsel often makes proceedings
more efficient, increases employee sophistication in assessing options,
makes administrative matters ... easier, and results in greater employee
satisfaction. ' 27 I agree. Even if the complaint does not implicate legal
rights, a lawyer can furnish invaluable aid in attaining resolution. Indeed,
the more a worker feels that having counsel has placed her on an equal
plane with her employer, protecting her interests from invasion, the greater
the chance of a durable settlement.
Another desirable, leveling feature of many company mediation plans
is the use of outside neutrals, provided by organizations like the American
Arbitration Association, JAMS/Endispute, or CPR."' Evaluators of the
273. See Stallworth, supra note 266, at 28. The United States District Courts for the
Southern and Eastern Districts of New York both have programs pursuant to which pro
bono counsel may represent pro se litigants in mediation. They enter for purposes of
settlement only and, thus, have no duty to stay with the case if negotiations lead to impasse.
See supra note 156.
274. See Stallworth, supra note 266, at 28.
275. See id. at 28-29; cf. Guidelines for Voluntary Mediation, supra note 267, at § IV
("Availability of counsel is the single most important protection against uninformed
abandonment of meritorious claims and unwarranted prosecution of meritless claims.").
276. See CPR INSTITUTE, supra note I 1, at 21.
277. Id.
278. Companies with programs using external mediators include Shell, Texaco, and GE
Capital. See id. at 378 (Shell); id. at 418 (Texaco); RESOLVE: EMPLOYEE ISSUE RESOLUTION
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well-regarded REDRESS program found that external mediators ranked
higher than internal ones, in terms of both settlement rates and party
contentment.27 9 These results are unsurprising; even if in-house mediators
can be fair, outside ones are more likely to seem so to the worker.
2 80
Companies further enhance the appearance and the reality of fair process
when they permit the employee to participate in choosing the mediator.
Such latitude makes good sense; especially if the employer pays the
mediation outfit's fees, the employee might otherwise fear that the
mediator will not be impartial. Major corporations with this approach
include Texaco, 28 1 GE Capital, 282 and United Parcel Service (UPS). 283 Also,
whatever the source of their roster, employers should ensure that it
embraces people of diverse backgrounds.284
Adoption of these best practices ought to go far to defuse the power-
imbalance concern in employer-employee mediation. This apprehension
operates at the micro-level, that of the individual case. As mentioned
previously, however, 28 ADR critics have frequently cited a second, macro-
level concern; they claim that these dispute resolution methods act to
privatize justice, thereby failing to enforce accountability to public
286norms.With respect to employment disputes specifically, some contend that
PROGRAM 18 (2000) (GE Capital company handbook) [hereinafter RESOLVE].
279. See Bingham & Pitts, supra note 138, at 137-39; Stallworth et al., supra note 101, at
84 (finding that the use of outside mediators "eliminates a structural bias-real or
perceived-that can undermine the credibility of a mediation program.").
280. Wariness of participating in a voluntary program on account of fear of bias can
affect the employer as well. Significantly, employers have displayed increasing reluctance
to participate in EEOC mediations-especially with internal mediators. See Swendiman,
supra note 157, at 405-06; see also Silberman et al., supra note 139, at 1556-57 (noting that
in the EEOC pilot program, Apr. 1, 1993-Mar. 31, 1994, only 39% of employers accepted
mediation-as compared with 87% of charging parties); Swendiman, supra note 157, at 399
(recording that in Oct. 1999, 36% of employers and 81% of charging parties agreed to
mediate); Dominguez Reports Drop, supra note 158, at 473 (reporting that in FY 2002, 30%
of employers and 83% of charging parties agreed to mediate).
281. See CPR INSTITUTE, supra note 11, app. G at 418-19.
282. See RESOLVE, supra note 278, at 18.
283. See CPR INSTITUTE, supra note 111, app. G at 446. UPS also specifies: "[Y]ou [the
employee] have the right to participate in the selection of the mediator from a list provided
by an outside mediation organization of your choice." Id. (emphasis added). If the
employer insists on using the same mediation provider or providers all the time, there is a
risk that individual mediators furnished by that organization will be, or seem to be, biased in
favor of the employer. Hence, the UPS approach, allowing the worker to choose the
company furnishing the mediator in her case, has much to commend it.
284. See Gadlin, supra note 215, at 44; Gunning, supra note 133, at 88-90; cf. Yelnosky,
supra note 56, at 608 (suggesting that racial, ethnic, or gender identity groups take part in
workplace mediation, if the complainant so desires).
285. See supra text accompanying note 250.
286. See Hope Viner Samborn, The Vanishing Trial, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2002, at 24, 26.
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mediation-by training its sights on personal interests and satisfaction-
leaves the surrounding discriminatory environment the same or, at best,
makes minor corrections of limited impact, such as transferring the
employee to a different department. 28 ' According to Professor Sturm, ADR
"rarely generates information or addresses practices that extend beyond the
participants in the immediate dispute .... ,,288 Further, with the sessions
themselves being confidential, and with employers routinely insisting on
confidentiality clauses in settlement agreements, mediation fails to create
precedents, thereby preventing desirable "public stigmatization of
discriminating employers. 289
This critique has some merit. Litigation will be needed at times: in-
house ADR regimes may not be able to respond to widespread, serious
290problems, especially if management is intransigent. While parties can
theoretically negotiate systemic solutions, as well as money, reinstatement,
references, or other terms geared solely to the employee's requirements, I
have mainly found employers unwilling to agree to broader remedies (for
example, diversity training) at the behest of a lone complainant. 291 Surely,
too, certain cases ought to go through trial and appeal so as to create
significant law to guide and bind interested persons in the future. By
analogy, one would not have wanted Brown v. Board of Education 29 to be
resolved by a mediated settlement addressing only the issues of the named
plaintiffs.
That being said, some companies will not have mediation programs;
even in the firms that do, fewer than all disputes will settle.293 I cannot
envision a time when courts will have to beg for work, especially in the
employment area. Also, the EEOC, as well as private parties (ordinarily
through class actions), will, presumably, continue to bring lawsuits
challenging a "pattern and practice" of illegal conduct. 294 It is primarily in
these settings that systemic change can occur, whether by judicial decree
alone or wide-ranging settlement terms embodied in a consent decree.
287. Cf, Gwartney-Gibbs & Lach, supra note 260, at 193 (noting that women use lateral
transfers to move away from disputes, which puts them at a disadvantage with regard to job-
specific training and expertise).
288. Sturm, Race, Gender, supra note 5, at 656-57.
289. Mayer, supra note 44, at 164.
290. See Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 5, at 543-44.
291. But cf. Yelnosky, supra note 56, at 602 (finding that 22% of mediated settlements at
the EEOC included agreements by employer to change workplace rules and practices).
292. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that laws requiring or permitting racial segregation in
public schools violate the Equal Protection Clause).
293. See Yelnosky, supra note 56, at 605.
294. See MODJESKA, supra note 79, § 6.14, at 6-58 (3d ed. 2002). The EEOC usually
files 300 to 400 cases per year, with class actions comprising about one-quarter to one-third
of the total. But in the first nine months of FY 2002, the agency had filed only 150 suits-
among them, 52 class actions. See Internal Review, supra note 112, at 204.
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295
Notably, REDRESS came into being as part of a class action settlement,
as did Home Depot's new and improved hiring, promotion, and training
plan296 which, incidentally, resulted from a mediation ordered by the court
on the eve of trial.297  Mediation can, therefore, play a useful part in
resolving big cases as well as small ones. At times, too, the EEOC can
achieve reform through internal proceedings by jawboning the targeted
298employer in its conciliation process.
Moreover, in taxing ADR with its limitations, we must once again
recall that the proper comparator is litigation, not some hypothetical,
idealized state of affairs. One should start from the baseline that, in
general, advocacy for workers tends to be "individualistic, compensatory,
and focused on after-the-fact enforcement of rule violations. 299 With or
without mediation, the vast majority of disparate treatment actions that
survive dismissal will end in settlement, not in judgment, and non-mediated
agreements are no less likely than mediated ones to contain a
confidentiality clause. Thus, if mediation results in privatized justice,
litigation does as well-only much later, and at greater expense to all.
The "macro" critique of mediation assumes a discriminatory job
environment. This cannot always be the case, unless we presume that all
workplace conflicts involving persons in protected classes (or, at least,
racial minorities) arise in whole or in part from unconscious discrimination.
And even if we did so, litigating unprovable bias will not lead to the
plaintiff's victory. Will it lead, nonetheless, to reforms? Smart employers,
including those that prevail in court, will learn that certain changes may be
required in order to minimize the risk of future suits, as well as
discrimination itself, and will, therefore, effectuate them. But since
litigation usually hardens people's attitudes, other defendants taken to court
by employees might become less inclined to remedy institutional problems
on their own.
In addition, the establishment of an in-house mediation program and,
more broadly, the steps leading up to and following it can also generate
information with respect to workplace issues. Another best-indeed,
vital-practice is for sponsors of such programs to establish procedures to
ensure that the firm learns what types of situations are generating trouble
and then to address these promptly and fully. Regardless of whether the
triggering event reflects discrimination or some other disturbing condition,
295. See Hallberlin, supra note 146, at 376-77.
296. See supra text accompanying note 107.
297. See Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 5, at 511.
298. Some critics have claimed, however, that the EEOC is a "toothless tiger." Id. at
550. The paucity of "reasonable cause" findings arguably lends some support to this view.
See Mayer, supra note 44, at 159 (remarking that reasonable cause is found in only 5% of
claims in which any finding is made).
299. Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 5, at 546.
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management must respond to it by doing more than just placating the actual
complainant.
First, the company representative directly involved in the mediation
has to extract from the case at hand general lessons concerning proper and
improper managerial conduct. Among other things, the discussions
occurring during the session may cause that person to scrutinize the firm's,
or his or her own, decisionmaking process and notice hitherto unseen
flaws. 00 The representative must, in turn, keep higher executives, with
power to effect more global changes, "in the loop" regarding the kinds of
circumstances giving rise to worker grievances. Although the rule of
confidentiality would typically prevent disclosure of what took place in the
mediation, supervisory personnel will know beforehand the employee's
charges and the data gleaned from the initial inquiry. In the words of the
program facilitator of PaineWebber's Issue Resolution Office: "Whenever
any form of discrimination is brought to our attention, we have a duty to
investigate."' 0 ' This obligation ought to extend to non-trivial complaints
unrelated to bias as well.
The firm can also design its program such that a limited number of
people with "need to know" status, who did not attend mediation sessions,
will be informed of facts required to carry out a settlement agreement or to
correct workplace problems that go beyond the specific complaint. The
former is necessary to the worker's own well-being. The latter, a
suggestion I offer with some diffidence, impacts the overall health of the
company. As the PaineWebber facilitator notes: "I routinely do a trend
analysis to see whether there are patterns that should trigger further
investigation. . . . I would find a way to make sure that we address any
significant problem. 30 2
The employer's reservation of a right to expand the circle of
confidentiality in order to further the interests of its whole work force
should not ordinarily entail a significant compromise of the complainant's
privacy. Even absent such a provision, some complainants might be
willing to waive confidentiality to the extent that doing so would enable the
employer to rectify undesirable conditions. Alternatively, in a large
company, the manager attending the mediation may be able, where
necessary, to report information culled from it in a way that conceals the
participants' identities.
Employers, moreover, have to be taught to move beyond merely
responding to worker complaints. They must learn to take the initiative to
uncover workplace issues that, as yet, have not surfaced through
accusations. The CPR study states that "[d]ispute management is
300. See Stallworth et al., supra note 101, at 39.
301. Early Dispute Resolution, supra note 169, at 3.
302. Id.
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fundamentally a managerial, not legal, task-yet managers remain
reactive. 3 °3 All of the systems they describe "rely solely on the employee
to identify problems and bring them to management. ''3°4 This is plainly far
from ideal. Happily, though, some companies have gotten the message that
they must take a proactive stance; 30 5 others will do the same, over time, if
only to protect themselves from suit.306
As a number of scholars in the field have noted, recent decisions of
the United States Supreme Court have lent desirable impetus to increased
employer self-regulation.3 7 In 1998, two decisions concerning charges of
hostile-environment harassment, Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth°8
and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,3° 9 created an "affirmative defense to
liability or damages" in cases that do not involve a so-called tangible
employment action like termination or demotion. The defense was
described as comprising "two necessary elements: (a) that the employer
'exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior,' and (b) that the plaintiff employee 'unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. ' ' 33 0
Shortly thereafter, the Court adopted a similar approach with respect
to punitive damages.311 In Kolstad v. American Dental Association,312
involving actions by managerial agents, the Court hedged an employer's
liability for such damages by establishing an affirmative defense that these
actions were contrary to good-faith efforts by the employer "to detect and
deter" discrimination.313
303. CPR INSTITUTE, supra note 11, at 45.
304. Id. at 46 (footnote omitted); cf Sturm, Race, Gender, supra note 5, at 676 (noting
that courts' focus on after-the-fact responses to particular harassment claims does not
conduce to organizational self-assessment).
305. For example, the Comprehensive Early Warning System used by GE Card Services
analyzes litigation trends to "create business awareness of potential litigation risks and
correct problematic business practices to prevent litigation and/or mitigate its potential
exposure." ADR Open House, supra note 247.
306. Some firms seek the advice of sophisticated employment counsel to help them to
comply with the law and improve their employment practices. See Sturm, Second
Generation, supra note 5, at 528-30.
307. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 6, at 612; Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 5, at
481-82.
308. 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
309. 524 U.S. 725, 807 (1998).
310. MODJESKA, supra note 79, § 1.05, at 38-39 (3d ed. Supp. 2002) (footnotes omitted):
see also Silberman et al., supra note 139, at 1553 (citing language in Meritor Savings Bank
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 71 (1986), supporting "the view that companies with effective internal
grievance procedures will have a stronger position in court.").
311. See Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 5, at 554 & n.349.
312. 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
313. Id. at 546.
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Given these developments, the time is ripe for corporate self-interest
to ally with corporate good citizenship to yield a more wholesome working
atmosphere founded on adoption of effective employment dispute
resolution processes.1 4 Mediation, in particular, accords well with the less
hierarchical, team-based, consensus-building, and cooperative model
increasingly embraced by progressive firms.31 5 That reality should only
serve to accelerate the trend toward its use in the modern workplace.
IV. CODA
In the post-9/l1, economically and physically perilous world,
Americans are suffering tremendous stress. Whether one's work
contributes to or allays that stress has great impact, now more than ever, on
the quality of one's life. I believe the approach to workplace dispute
resolution set out in this article can, as many employers have already
realized, not only shield them from litigation by employees past and
present, but also make the job environment happier for all.
Once again, let me be clear on a major point: by recommending that
mediation of employment conflicts not be tethered to the peg of unlawful
discrimination, I in no way mean to suggest that the working world is free
from bias. Nor do I wish to sweep such bias under the rug. When an
employee in good faith believes his employer has treated him
discriminatorily, he should say so, laying out his grounds for suspicion.
And if the company, informally, through mediation, or some other type of
ADR, does not satisfactorily resolve the matter, then the employee may file
a charge with the EEOC (or equivalent state or local agency) and, if need
be, go to court.
Nothing, of course, can ensure that employers receive only plausible
claims of bias; the employee may frame his complaint as he sees fits. But
dispensing with the need to affix the label "discrimination" to conduct
perceived as wrong or unfair in order to be heard by a neutral party
should--over time---diminish the temptation to make protected categories
the centerpiece of every grievance and, thereby, reduce the harmful
consequences of this practice.
Professor Estlund writes of the "mediating role of the workplace."
3 1 6
Her terminology refers not to actual mediation but rather to the role which
the modern diverse workplace can play in overcoming group divisions. As
314. According to the Program Facilitator of PaineWebber's Issue Resolution Office:
"We have been told by federal and state civil rights agencies that having F.A.I.R. [Forum
for Alternate Issue Resolution] gives them a better perspective on us as a good and fair
employer." Early Dispute Resolution, supra note 169, at 3.
315. See Kahan & Deem, supra note 117, at 31-32.
316. Estlund, Changing Workplace, supra note 11, at 337.
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she points out, it represents the "single most important site of cooperative,
interaction and sociability among adult citizens outside the family."3 7 Yet
in all too many places, that sentiment is more aspirational than descriptive.
This article reflects the belief that if employers deal with workers'
problems humanely and sensibly while these are still "acorns," and not yet
"oaks," many more jobs will provide the harmonious setting that Professor
Estlund envisions, racially and otherwise. Mediation of employment
disputes, structured along the lines I have outlined, offers much promise as
a route toward achieving that worthy end.
317. Id. at 344.
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